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"There shall be one form of action to be known as [a] 'civil
action.' "- Thus, the 1967 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure, with
the consequent procedural merger of law and equity has made Florida a
1. FLA. R. Cir. P. 1.040. All reference to rules in the text will refer to the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
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code pleading jurisdiction. The current revision made many minor changes
in style, grammar and punctuation, none of which was intended to change
the meaning or intent of any rule.' Substantial changes in the rules will
be indicated within the appropriate topic. The statutorily-styled number-
ing system of the new rules will be used throughout this article, even
though many of the cases were decided under the previous rules. Only
when necessary will the previous numbers be cited. Due to the merger of
law and equity, the distinction between the two is noted only where still
appropriate.
I. COURTS, JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS
A. Courts
The plaintiff sued the defendant in a small claims court and served
him with a notice to appear. The defendant filed an unverified motion to
dismiss for improper venue, but did not appear at the time prescribed in
the notice. The court entered a default judgment. On appeal, the de-
fendant argued that his motion to dismiss constituted a general appear-
ance and that the judge could not enter a default judgment without hear-
ing the motion and giving the defendant a notice to appear. The court
affirmed the judgment, holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to small claims courts8 and that it would be manifestly unjust to say
that the court cannot properly enter a default judgment under these
circumstances .
4
Although it is more orderly to issue an order of transfer or consolida-
tion when a case is shunted from one judge to another within the same
circuit, this is a matter of internal administration and does not affect the
validity of the orders entered by either judge.5
B. Judges
1. JUDGE REMOVED BECAUSE OF PREJUDICE
The third district refused to answer a certified question, to wit:
Does a circuit judge to whom a cause is re-assigned have juris-
diction to hear and rule upon a motion to vacate a default judg-
ment when the first circuit judge before whom the case was
originally pending, who refused to vacate a default judgment,
2. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 638 (Fla. 1966).
In promulgating the new rules, the court included the subcommittee notes.
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted rules of procedure for civil actions in the
County Judges' Court, County Courts, Justice of the Peace Courts and Small Claims Courts.
See In re Summary Claims Procedure Rules, 203 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1967), amended, 205 So.2d
297 (Fla. 1967) and *211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
4. Palatka Auto Auction, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 191 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
5. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Gaines Constr. Co., 191 So.2d 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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has been judicially prohibited from proceeding with the cause
because of his prejudice?6
The court stated that the propriety of refusing to vacate the default judg-
ment had been previously upheld7 thus becoming the law of the case, and
noted that the first judge's prejudice had occurred after he had ruled on
the motion to vacate.
2. JUDGE ASSIGNED FROM ANOTHER CIRCUIT
In an eminent domain proceeding, a judge assigned from another cir-
cuit may enter a supplemental judgment for interest and attorney's fees
where the period of his assignment has not expired.8
3. AUTHORITY OF SUCCESSOR JUDGES
A Florida statute requires a successor judge to hear and determine
all matters pending before the original judge upon the latter's death,
resignation or retirement. 9 In a case of first impression, the second district
held that the statute is ambiguous and does not authorize a successor
judge to weigh and compare the testimony of witnesses he did not see.
Thus, where oral testimony is produced at trial and the cause is left un-
determined by the original judge, his successor cannot render a verdict or
judgment without a trial de novo unless upon the record by stipulation of
the parties. A judge is certainly as important as a juror, and no verdict
could be upheld if a juror were absent.' °
However, when a judge who has heard a cause and dictated a final
judgment retires from the bench without signing it, his successor has juris-
diction to complete the action by signing the judgment. Generally, a suc-
cessor judge may complete any acts uncompleted by his predecessor where
they do not require the successor to weigh and compare testimony." This
result seems just since parties should suffer no detriment by reason of the
resignation, death or impeachment of a judge."
4. JUDGES WITHIN THE SAME CIRCUIT
Two separate suits to appoint a receiver for the same company were
filed in different divisions of the same circuit court. One judge appointed
a receiver and then, without any formal order, the two suits were con-
solidated before a different judge who removed the first appointee and
6. Jensen v. Hoofe, 184 So.2d 696, 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
7. Jensen v. Hoofe, 136 So.2d 680 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
8. Dean v. State Rd. Dep't, 184 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). See also FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.020(c) (4).
9. FLA. STAT. § 38.12 (1967).
10. Bradford v. Foundation & Marine Constr. Co., 182 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966.)
11. Olympic Mfg. Co. v. Shepherd, 190 So.2d 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
12. FLA. STAT. § 38.12 (1967).
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named a different person to act as receiver in both cases. The district
court of appeal held that each judge in the court may perform all the
duties prescribed for circuit judges and the decision of one judge is the
decision of the court. The court noted that the second judge did not vacate
the prior order but merely substituted receivers."3
5. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
A justice of the peace is included within the general rule that no
action can be maintained against a judge of any court for an error in
judgment committed in execution of his official duties. 4
C. Attorneys
1. AMENDMENTS
Subsection (e) of Rule 1.030, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure now
provides that:
Attorneys for a party may be substituted at any time by order
of court. No substitute attorney shall be permitted to appear in
the absence of such an order. The court may condition such sub-
stitution upon payment of or security for the substituted attor-
ney's fee and expenses or upon such terms as may be just.
The Committee Notes state that the new subsection sets out the existing
law as stated in Diem v. Diem'" and other cases. 16
2. ATTORNEY FEES
In Strickland v. Frey,'7 the attorney represented the plaintiff after
the two had signed a contingent fee contract whereby the attorney would
receive forty percent of the proceeds of any recovery. The plaintiff re-
ceived a jury verdict in the amount of ten thousand dollars, but judgment
was not entered because of a pending counterclaim. After three years, the
plaintiff, without his attorney's knowledge, settled the claim with the de-
fendant for five hundred dollars. The defendant then amended his answer
by asserting a release and satisfaction, whereupon the attorney filed a
reply alleging a fraudulent and collusive settlement between his client and
the defendant with the intent to deprive him of his fee. The attorney then
moved to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of prosecution 8 and for entry
of final judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the jury verdict. The
judge dismissed the counterclaim, denied final judgment and ordered a
trial to determine whether the settlement was fraudulent. After trial by
13. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Gaines Constr. Co., 191 So.2d 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
14. Silvers v. Drake, 188 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
15. 136 Fla. 824, 187 So. 569 (1939).
16. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 637 (Fla. 1966).
17. 187 So.2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
18. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
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the court, a four thousand dollar judgment was entered against the de-
fendant in favor of the plaintiff's attorney. On appeal, the court found no
error 1 9 and held that:
In some circumstances an attorney will be permitted to continue
a suit in the name of his client in order to recover his fees and
costs after his client has made a fraudulent or collusive settle-
ment with the intent to deprive his attorney of fees and costs.
2 0
The guardian of an incompetent in Florida sold part of the estate's
property in Indiana. The attorney for the purchasers performed services
on behalf of the seller which would ordinarily be done by the seller. The
guardian's attorney had knowledge of the services. The purchaser's attor-
ney filed suit in the county judge's court and was awarded a fee. The dis-
trict court of appeal held that there was an implied contract sufficient to
uphold the award.2 Regardless of such a finding, however, the court
could grant the fee on a quantum meruit basis.22 The award was deemed
proper.2"
II. PROCESS
Generally, the recent cases in this area are concerned with whether a
Florida court has obtained judicial jurisdiction over a non-resident, cor-
porate or individual.
Section 48.17 of the Florida Statutes contains the procedures for
substituted service on a defendant who conceals his whereabouts. Section
48.161 provides that in such a situation, the plaintiff must serve the Sec-
retary of State and mail a notice of such service and a copy of process by
registered or certified mail to the defendant. The defendant's return re-
ceipt therefore and the plaintiff's affidavit that he complied with the
statute must be filed with the court. In Steedman v. Polero, 4 the plaintiff
had complied with all the statutes for substituted service except mailing a
copy of process to the defendant and filing the return receipt and affidavit
of compliance with the court. The defendant appealed a denial of his
motion to quash service. The court held that the omitted procedures could
not be required in cases where the defendant concealed himself, observing
that: "Obviously, mail could not be sent to a defendant whose where-
abouts are unknown, nor could an officer serve him if he cannot be
found." 5
19. The dissenting judge could find no basis for allowing the attorney's claim because
there was no service of process on the defendant and the court lacked jurisdiction; the
attorney was not a party to the action and could not intrude his collateral issue into the
main case; the measure of damages for the attorney was forty percent of the judgment for
the plaintiff, yet that judgment was not final and could conceivably be reversed on appeal.
20. Sentco, Inc. v. McCulloh, 84 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1955).
21. Dierick v. Wisehart, 195 So.2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
22. Lucom v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 97 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1957).
23. FLA. STAT. § 745.33 (1967).
24. 181 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist, 1965).
25. Id. at 203.
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When a plaintiff, in an attempt to serve process upon a corporation,
serves a person who the plaintiff knows has severed all connections with
the corporation, the service is obviously invalid.26 In this case, the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process and lack of juris-
diction over the defendant was denied. The defendant appealed and at the
same time requested a supersedeas27 from the trial court which was
granted. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff obtained an alias
summons28 and properly served the president of the defendant corporation
who moved to quash. This motion was also denied and a second appeal was
taken.
The court held that Rule 1.160 provides for the issuance of mesne
process, which does not require that an order of court be granted. The
supersedeas bars further litigation only on the order appealed. Thus,
no order of the court was required for the clerk to issue the alias sum-
mons. Further, an "insurance summons" has received tacit approval in
Florida,29 and "the mere fact of service of process, especially one in which
there is some suspicion of invalidity, does not bar issuance of a second
summons by the clerk.""0
A corporation which has not been properly served and unsuccessfully
moves for dismissal for insufficiency of service of process, does not waive
its right to again raise the question by participating further in the cause."'
In this case, the plaintiff sought to prevent certain actions concerning real
property and filed a lis pendens8 All three defendants joined the motion
to dismiss the lis pendens, but only the corporate defendant had previ-
ously moved for dismissal for insufficiency of service of process. Subse-
quently, all three defendants moved to dismiss for such insufficiency. The
court held that the corporation's motion should be granted, but the other
defendants had waived the objection because they had proceeded first on
the merits by their motion to dismiss the lis pendens and only thereafter
had attempted to challenge the court's jurisdiction.3
Nonresident witnesses and suitors who come to Florida for the pur-
pose of attending court are immune from service of process while attend-
ing the judicial action 34 except when the process in the second suit is
26. Sunrise Beach, Inc. v. Phillips, 181 So.2d 169 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
27. FLA. App. R. 5.1.
28. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160.
29. Punta Gorda Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Green Manor Constr. Co., 166 So.2d
889 (Fla. 1964).
30. Sunrise Beach, Inc. v. Phillips, 181 So.2d 169, 171-72 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
31. Green v. Roth, 192 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
32. See FLA. R. Civ. P. Form 1.918.
33. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(a), (h). It should be noted that the defendants in this case
had never filed a responsive pleading and the case does not come within the exact terms
of the rule. However, the court stated that a similar construction had been made of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12, the counterpart of Rule 1.140. Stavang v. American Potash &
Chem. Corp., 344 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1965).
34. Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla. 442, 178 So. 112 (1937).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
issued in litigation incident to or correlated with the subject matter of the
proceedings for which the nonresident came to Florida."
When the suit for which the nonresident is in attendance involves
fraud, misrepresentation, etc., in obtaining money from a bank account
and the second suit is for fraud, misrepresentation, etc., in obtaining pro-
ceeds from an estate, the issues are not incidental or correlative and the
service of process should be quashed. Further, the exception to the im-
munity rule is not applicable when there is a lack of identity of parties,
and an executrix of an estate is not identical with the decedent-plaintiff
in the first action.38
Section 47.23 of the Florida Statutes provides, inter alia, that "[t] he
courts of this state shall obtain jurisdiction of minors when the original
writ of subpoena or summons ad respondendum . . . is served by reading
the writ or summons to be served to the minor to be served." A sheriff's
return37 which recites that a writ was served on the minor by serving the
minor's mother at her usual place of abode is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of the statute. The court does not have jurisdiction unless
the return indicates that the writ or summons was actually read to the
minor.3 8
The defendant's motion to sever a complaint 9 was granted where-
upon the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that a new suit re-
sulted from the severance and that the required process had not been
served.40 The motion was denied. On appeal, the court held that there were
two ways in which jurisdiction could have been obtained in the severed
case. First, additional service of process could have been made. Second,
appropriate copies of the record in the original case, including a showing
of process, could have been encompassed in the record of the severed
case.4 ' However, because the appellant had not provided the court with a
record evidencing a lack of process, the court affirmed the denial of the
motion to dismiss.42
It has been previously held that in cases of conflict between courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first exercises jurisdiction by
having its summons served, acquires control of the action to the exclusion
of the other.43 However, Rule 1.050 provides that actions shall be deemed
35. State ex rel. Ivey v. Circuit Court, 51 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1951).
36. Bruner v. Robins, 191 So.2d 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
37. Although the circumstances of this case precluded it, a plaintiff is usually entitled
to additional process against a defendant when the original process is returned improperly
executed. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
38. Flint v. Baker, 189 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
39. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b).
40. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(b).
41. FLA. STAT. § 46.08 (1967).
42. City of South Bay v. Armstrong, 188 So.2d 21 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
43. Martinez v. Martinez, 153 Fla. 753, 15 So.2d 842 (1943).
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commenced when the complaint is filed. Thus, when a complaint is filed
first in a circuit court in one county and another filed subsequently in a
small claims court in another county, the former will have jurisdiction
even though process is served first in the latter action."
III. VENUE
A. In General
Venue, of course, means the geographical area in which a defendant
has a privilege to be sued or tried, while jurisdiction is the power of a
court to hear and determine a particular cause.45 At common law, venue
for local actions was the county in which the disputed land lay or a dis-
puted transaction took place, and venue for transitory actions could be
laid in any county where the court could acquire jurisdiction of the de-
fendant.46 The Florida general venue statute47 provides generally that
suits shall be commenced in the county (1) where the defendant resides,
or (2) where the cause of action accrued, or (3) where the property in
litigation is located. This venue privilege may be waived by a proper
agreement.48
The statute specifically uses the word "defendant." Thus, when a
plaintiff brings an action for negligence against an administrator for the
allegedly negligent decedent, it is proper to bring the cause in the country
where the administrator resides. Since the administrator is the defendant
and the legislature has made no special provision for such a case, the
venue is proper.49
In an action based on both breach of an implied warranty and negli-
gence, the plaintiff corporation sued in the county where the defendant
corporation's'0 product was accepted by the plaintiff, a distributor of the
defendant's goods. The defendant moved to dismiss because of improper
venue, alleging that all its acts regarding the transaction took place in
another county. The motion was denied, and on appeal the court pointed
out that suits upon several causes of action may be brought where either
of the causes arose."' Further, causes of action based on an implied war-
ranty of a product clearly accrue where the product is accepted. Thus,
venue was proper and it was not necessary to decide the proper venue for
the alleged negligence.
52
44. Hunt v. Ganaway, 180 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
45. Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 196 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
46. F. JAmEs, CIVIL PROCrzURE 616, 617 (1965).
47. FLA. STAT. 46:01 (1967).
48. Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 196 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
49. O'Brien v. Mitchell, 190 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
S0. Suits against a domestic corporation may be commenced where the cause of action
accrued. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1967).
51. FLA. STAT. § 46.03 (1967).
52. James V. Freeman, Inc. v. Chemical Packaging Corp., 189 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966).
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In the statute fixing venue for corporations," the phrase, "where the
cause of action accrued" can be vexing. Regarding libel actions, the
question of where the cause accrued has recently been answered by the
Supreme Court of Florida for the first time. In Firstamerica Development
Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp.,54 the court held that the
plaintiff may obtain proper venue in any county where the newspaper
corporation, by its own action, circulates the defamatory matter. In this
case the defendant had a very limited circulation in Dade County but the
extent of circulation was held not to be determinative. The court also
indicated its approval of the "single publication rule" which would allow
the plaintiff only one cause of action, regardless of the number of counties
in which the libelous material is circulated. However, this issue was not
before the court and no direct holding was made.55
In Cicero v. Paradis,5 ° a father brought suit in his own right for in-
juries to his minor son. The minor, at that time, was a defendant in a cause
filed in another county arising from the same accident. The court agreed
that the father had an independent cause of action57 but held that since
he was permitted by statute 8 to join his son's cause of action, he should
be permitted to join only in the action where his son's cause was pending.
B. Change of Venue
When the trial judge recognizes that the appropriate venue is in an-
other county, he should immediately grant a motion to transfer.5" The
fact that the attorneys have made unclear stipulations which the plaintiff
claims require the defendant to submit to a deposition in the county where
the suit was originally filed does not authorize the judge to condition his
grant of the motion or transfer on such appearance. The judge in the
county to which the cause is transferred should decide the place of the
deposition.o
C. State Agencies
The courts of a county wherein a state agency makes an administra-
tive order usually have venue for judicial review of the order. However,
where there is: (1) a threatened invasion of a constitutional right; or
(2) an attempt to seize property, the local circuit court where the invasion
53. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1967).
54. 196 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1966).
55. Id. at 104. This case was approved by the legislature. FLA. STAT. § 770.05-08 (1967).
56. 184 So.2d 212 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
57. Id. at 215.
58. FLA. STAT. § 46.09 (1967). The dissenter argued that the statute permits the father
to join his cause of action with that of the son's but did not compel it.
59. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.060(b).
60. Spalding v. Von Zamft, 180 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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or attempted seizure occurs has venue notwithstanding the fact that the
order is made elsewhere.61
D. Contractual Relationships
It is established in Florida that contracts which require the payment
of money but do not specify the place of payment will be construed to
require payment at the residence or place of business of the payee.6" The
rationale is that when money is owed, the debtor should seek the creditor.
The Supreme Court of Florida has recently reiterated the rule, holding
that it makes no difference whether the suit is brought in general or special
assumpsit; the cause of action arises in the county of residence of the
payee.63
A different situation arises when the plaintiff has been paid for all
the work he has completed on a construction contract and the defendant
refuses to allow completion of the work. In such a case, the plaintiff's
damages would be the profit which he would have realized had he been
allowed to complete the contract. Since the action is not for money owed,
the cause of action against the defendant corporation accrued within
the county where the contract was to be performed or the county where
the defendant's place of business is located.64 Venue was improperly laid
in the plaintiff's county of residence. 65
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Florida has no law similar to the federal statute which codifies the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This codification allows a judge to
transfer the action to a more convenient forum where venue would also
be proper.66
In Florida, the right is granted to a plaintiff to select a forum 67 and
that right may not be withdrawn by a court on the grounds that a differ-
ent forum might better suit the convenience of a defendant, whether it is
suggested that the cause be transferred to a different county in this state,
68
or to another state. 9
However, state courts are authorized to apply the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in cases involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act.7°
61. Williams v. Ferrentino, 199 So.2d 504 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
62. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 599 (1966).
63. Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
64. FLA. STAT. § 46.04 (1967).
65. Mendez v. George Hunt, Inc., 191 So.2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
67. FLA. STAT. ch. 46 (1967).
68. Touchton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 155 So.2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
69. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Downtown Inv. Co., 188 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
70. Missouri ex rel. So. Pac. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1959).
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In such cases, it is within the discretion of the trial court whether to ap-
ply the doctrine and the appellate court will review only that discretion.71
In a case of first impression, the record disclosed acute forum shopping, in-
accessability to proof, unavailability of compulsory process, nonresident
litigants, etc. The denial of the motion to dismiss constituted an abuse of
discretion and was reversed.72
IV. COMiIMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Many of the cases during this survey period have construed particular
statutes of limitation. They are arranged below under the appropriate
heading. The effect of the statutes is also discussed under the topics of
Amended Pleadings 73 and Summary Judgement.7 4
A. Delinquent Taxes
The Florida Statutes provide generally that after twenty years from
the date of issuance, no action may be commenced on a delinquent tax
certificate by a private holder.75 The clerks of the circuit courts are in-
structed to mark such certificates as cancelled.76 The provisions of these
laws have also been extended to the state and its agencies, counties and
municipal corporations.77
In Smith v. City of Arcadia,7" the city attempted to foreclose a lien
for unpaid municipal taxes for the year 1923. At the time of the delin-
quency, the city was not required to issue delinquent tax certificates. The
trial court entered a summary judgment for the city, evidently on the
basis that the above-mentioned statutes were not applicable because the
action was not based on a delinquent tax certificate. On appeal, the court
reversed and held that the obvious intention of the legislature was to free
real estate of most liens arising out of tax levies more than twenty years
old. To hold that the statutes barred actions on delinquent tax certificates
but not actions for liens arising out of unpaid taxes for which no certificate
was issued would be ridiculous. Although a court of equity is not bound
by statutes of limitations, it may nevertheless apply the doctrine to laches
to achieve the same result.
B. Workmen's Compensation
There is a conflict in the statutes which, under certain circumstances,
effectively preclude a workmen's compensation insurance carrier from
recovering its subrogated claim for damages from a municipality. Section
71. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Cameron, 190 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
72. Southern Ry. v. McCubbins, 196 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
73. See p. 470 infra.
74. See p. 495 infra.
75. FLA. STAT. § 196.12 (1967).
76. FLA. STAT. § 194.58 (1967).
77. FLA. STAT. § 95.021 (1967).
78. 185 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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440.39 provides that if an injured employee or his dependents fail to bring
suit against a tortfeasor within one year from the time the cause of action
accrued, the insurance carrier may sue the wrongdoer. However, section
95.24 provides that no action shall be brought against any city or village
for any negligent or wrongful injury unless brought within twelve months
from the time of injury. Thus, if the injured employee does not bring a
suit within one year, the carrier is also precluded from ever bringing
suit against the city.79 The renunciation by the injured claimant of the
right to sue within one year does not amount to a waiver which will allow
the carrier to institute proceedings one day prior to the expiration of one
year. The court indicated that any action to alter the conflict must be
taken by the legislature, not by the courts.8s
C. Foreign Judgments
The Florida seven-year limitation period for actions other than those
for the recovery of real property applies to foreign judgments. 8' This rule
applies even though the note sued upon in this state was made in another
state which has laws permitting judgments rendered on such notes to be
renewed by judicial action at regular intervals. The renewal proceedings
are invalid and the statutory bar of the lex fori is not removed if the de-
fendant had not been served with process, had not voluntarily appeared




Section 95.11(5) (c) of the Florida Statutes prescribes a three-year
statute of limitation upon an "action for taking, detaining or injuring any
goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal
property." Section 95.11(4) provides a four-year statute of limitation on
other actions not specifically provided for in the chapter. In International
Mail Order, Inc. v. Capitol National Bank," the plaintiff brought an
action for reconversion more than three but less than four years after the
cause of action had accrued. The court affirmed an order of summary
judgment for the defendant on the basis that an action for conversion
was included in the three-year period of limitation.
E. Invasion of Privacy
An action for invasion of privacy is an "action not specifically pro-
vided for in this chapter," and the limitation period is four years.84 The
79. United States Cas. Co. v. Town of Palm Beach, 119 So.2d 800 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
80. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 185 So.2d 174 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1966).
81. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2) (1967).
82. Markham v. Gottegen, 179 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
83. 192 So.2d 287 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
84. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1967).
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statute does not disclose whether the period begins to run when the inva-
sion occurs or when the plaintiff learns of it. In Houston v. Florida-Georgia
Television Company,85 it was held that the period begins when the in-
vasion occurs. The ignorance of the plaintiff is a result of a lack of due
diligence and a party cannot take advantage of his own fault. The result
might be otherwise if the defendant were guilty of secret fraud or fraudu-
lent concealment."
F. Defendant out of the Jurisdiction
Generally, when a defendant is out of the state and cannot be served
whether personally or constructively, the statute of limitations is tolled. 7
When such a situation occurs, the statute is tolled even though the de-
fendant, during a four-year residence in another state, has returned to
Florida for short periods which total eight months."8
In Aviation Credit Corp. v. Batchelor,9 the defendant lived in
California when he signed a note payable in Florida and continued to live
there until seven years after the breach had occurred. He then moved to
Florida where he was sued on the note. The trial judge entered summary
judgment for the defendant on the basis that the cause of action accrued
in California and that Florida's "borrowing statute"90 made the California
limitation period (which barred the action) applicable. The appellate
court held that the cause of action accrued where the contract was to be
performed, and that Florida's five-year limitation appliedY1 Although a
literal application of the tolling statute92 would require a conclusion that
it would not be applicable to this case because one cannot return to the
state unless he has first been in it, the court felt bound by previous de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of Florida which held that the statute would
apply and an action could be brought against an out-of-state defendant
when he came into the state.93
G. Estoppel
Section 733.16 provides that claims or demands for damages for the
acts of a decedent shall be barred unless filed within six months from the
time of the first publication of notice to creditors. In North v. Culmer,94
85. 192 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
86. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(5)(d) (1967).
87. Levy v. Kirk, 187 So.2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); FLA. STAT. § 95.06 (1967).
88. Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
89. 190 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
90. FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1967).
91. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1967).
92. FLA. STAT. § 95.07 (1967) provides, inter alia, "If, when the cause of action shall
accrue against a person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the
term herein limited after his return to the state ......
93. E.g., Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335 (1937).
94. 193 So.2d 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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the plaintiff had a claim for damages against a person and was negotiating
with an insurance company who was representing the person. The plain-
tiff's attorney did not know of the person's death which occurred in an-
other county. The statutory notice was also published in the other county.
The insurance company indicated to the attorney that the claim would be
settled and changed adjusters several times. The plaintiff was finally in-
formed that the claim was barred because of the above-mentioned statute.
The court held that the facts of the case raised an estoppel, relieving the
plaintiff of the burden of the statute. Since the insurance company was a
privy to the defendant executor, the plaintiff should be allowed to raise
the affirmative defense of estoppel to meet the claim of the statute of
limitation contained in the defendant's answer.
An estoppel may also arise when the plaintiff sues the wrong de-
fendant who, with knowledge that he is the wrong defendant, continues
to file motions in the cause until the period of limitations has expired.
This is especially true where there is a close connection between the de-
fendant who was served and the proper defendant. 5
V. PLEADINGS
A. Pleadings Allowed or Required
The pleadings which are allowed or required are contained in Rule
1.100. The 1967 revision of the rules made no substantial changes in this
area. For a discussion of the changes which were made in the 1965 re-
vision, the reader is referred to the previous Survey of Civil Procedure.9 6
B. Complaint
One of the most significant additions to the 1967 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the proposed forms for use with the rules.97 As adopted by
the Supreme Court, the letter of submission by The Florida Bar states,
"The following forms of process shall be sufficient in all actions. De-
partures from these forms shall not void papers which are otherwise suf-
ficient and the forms may be varied .... The following forms of com-
plaints and petitions are sufficient for the types of cases they cover ...."98
It would seem that the practitioner would be wise, and safe, by fully
utilizing the new forms.
A complaint should set forth a "short and plain statement of the
ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"99 and "[a]ll
.95. In this case, the corporation which was served and the proper defendant corporation
had several common officers; their agent for service was the same person and the names were
similar.
96. Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 608, 609 (1966).
97. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 638 (Fla. 1966).
98. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 638 (Fla. 1966).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b).
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pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantial justice." 00 The com-
plaint must be sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the
claims against him.1 1 A complaint which alleges legal conclusions but
does not allege facts to support the conclusions is usually held to be
legally insufficient. 02
In Morgan v. Morgan," the wife sued for divorce on the ground of
extreme cruelty. The complaint listed several of the husband's alleged
shortcomings but concluded with the phrase, "plaintiff charges defendant
with extreme cruelty." The trial judge denied the husband's motion to
dismiss, but the district court reversed, holding that the complaint lacked
sufficient ultimate facts. It is submitted that cases of this nature should be
evaluated today in the light of the official forms. Form 1.943 requires
only that the complaint state that the defendant has been guilty of extreme
cruelty to plaintiff.
The legal sufficiency of a complaint is usually tested by a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.0 4 For purposes of the mo-
tion, all allegations of fact in the complaint are taken as true and the
action should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff could
not be entitled to any relief under the facts pleaded. 0 5 If two separate
claims are stated in one count and the complaint is not so vague, in-
definite or ambiguous as wholly to fail to state a cause of action, the court
should not dismiss but should entertain a motion for separate statements
and a more definite statement. 06 Allegations which go to the merits or
attack the veracity of a complaint should be set out in the answer'07 and
not raised in a motion to dismiss.'08 The question of whether a dismissal
for failure to state a cause should be with prejudice is discussed else-
where. 0 9
The parties to an action are usually bound by the admissions and al-
legations contained in the pleadings." 0 This statement, however, refers
to those pleadings upon which issue is finally joined. Since cases may be
decided on issues which are not raised by the pleadings"' and the rules
100. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g).
101. Richardson v. Sams, 166 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
102. Baya v. Williams, 184 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
103. 180 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
104. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
105. Lytell v. McGahey Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 180 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
106. PIowden & Roberts, Inc. v. Conway, 192 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966); In-
dustrial Medicine Publishing Co. v. Colonial Press, Inc., 181 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(c).
108. Nelson v. Ward, 190 So.2d 622 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
109. See p. 488 inira.
110. Carvell v. Kinsey, 87 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1956).
111. "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised by the pleadings."
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
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allow alternative positions to be taken by a party regardless of con-
sistency, 12 it would be anomalous to allow one party to use the opposing
party's pleadings as evidence when no attempt is made by the party to
prove the facts alleged in his pleadings." 13 By the same reasoning, an ad-
mission which a defendant makes in a cross-claim against a co-defendant
may not be used as evidence by the plaintiff when the cross-claim has been
eliminated by a final summary judgment. The cross-claim has been
dropped from the case leaving the record in the same position it would
have been in had the cross-claim not been filed." 4
When the plaintiff files a motion to amend the complaint by "adding"
a paragraph, he is not necessarily bound to the statement. In Vann v.
Hobbs," '5 plaintiff's counsel actually wanted to substitute a count of simple
negligence for a count of gross negligence. The defendant was precluded
from reading the deleted count of gross negligence into evidence.
"In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent,
it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall
be made specifically and with particularity.""" However, this rule has not
altered the fact that the sufficiency of the allegations may be tested by a
motion to dismiss."17 The fact that the rule requires that a denial of per-
formance or occurrence must be made with particularity does not make
the denial an affirmative defense which cannot be raised by motion.,",
Thus, if the plaintiff chooses to state the performance of conditions prece-
dent with a particularity not required by the rules and specific allegations
disclose facts which will necessarily defeat the cause of action then, on
motion, the complaint may be dismissed.""
The rules require that when items of special damage are claimed,
they must be specifically pleaded. 2 However, if such items are not
pleaded and evidence concerning them is introduced without objection,
the judge may consider the pleadings to be amended 12 and give instruc-
tions to the jury concerning the special damages. 22
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g)
113. Hines v. Trager Constr. Co., 188 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
114. Id. at 830.
115. 197 So.2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
116. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(c).
117. Wagman v. Lefcoe, 167 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
118. See p. 498 inira.
119. Plowden & Roberts, Inc. v. Conway, 192 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966); Martin
v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., 172 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d).
120. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.120(g).
121. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).
122. Gardner v. Terminal Transp. Co., 189 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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C. Defenses
1. IN GENERAL
Every defense should be included in a responsive pleading except
those defenses which the rules permit to be raised by motion.
123 Of
course, a defense may be waived 2" under certain circumstances and the
grounds for a defense may be waived if not specifically stated.12 A party
is well advised to preserve any waivable defense by motion before in any
way pleading to the merits of a cause of action. 26 A defendant may plead
alternative and inconsistent defenses in one count or in separate counts .
27
Generally, affirmative defenses must be set forth in a pleading and are
not appropriate in a motion.128 The denial of a plaintiff's motion to strike
certain allegations of defense from the defendant's answer is not review-
able by certiorari unless irreparable harm would otherwise result to the
plaintiff129
2. RAISING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES BY MOTION
In Martin v. Highway Equipment Supply Co.,1" 0 the court held that
when a complaint shows a defect on its face which will defeat the claim,
the defendant may raise the appropriate affirmative defense in a motion
to dismiss. The district courts could not agree as to the propriety of this
action. The first' and third.. districts refused to allow an affirmative
defense to be so raised. The second'33 and fourth" 4 districts approved the
procedure.
The issue appears to have been decided by the 1967 revision to the
rules." 5 A sentence has been added to Rule 1.110 (d), to wit: "Affirmative
defenses appearing on the face of a prior pleading may be asserted as
grounds for a motion or defense under Rule 1.140(b); provided this shall
not limit amendments under Rule 1.190 even if such ground is sustained."
The subcommittee notes state that "If the pleader affirmative show [sic]
that he has no claim in his pleading, the claim should be disposed of at
the earliest possible stage." 3 6
123. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
124. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(h).
125. FLA. R. Civ. 1.140(b).
126. See Green v. Roth, 192 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
127. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g).
128. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). But see p. 498 infra.
129. Nobel v. McNeil, 179 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
130. 172 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Hawkins v. Williams, 200 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1967).
131. Croft v. Young, 188 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
132. Staples v. Battisti, 191 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
133. Martin v. Highway Equip. Supply Co., 172 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
134. Plowden & Roberts, Inc. v. Conway, 192 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
135. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1966).
136. Id. at 637.
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D. Corporate Pleading
In a case of first impression the second district held that a complaint
signed by the president of a corporation who was not an attorney is a
nullity. Such a pleading must be signed by a practicing member of the
bar. 3 ' The fact that an individual is permitted to represent himself in
court does not permit a corporation to do so. 8' A corporation is not per-
mitted to practice law and since the complaint is a nullity, it is not amend-
able." 9 If any relief is to be obtained, the complaint must be refiled.'40
E. Counterclaims
With certain exceptions, "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, provided it arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim .... ,,141 A
party need not state a counterclaim not arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence. 42 However, the fact that the trial of a permissive counter-
claim might unduly prolong a trial is not ground for striking or dismissing
the counterclaim.' 43 If such a problem occurs, the judge has the authority
to order a separate trial of the counterclaim.'"
When a defendant files a counterclaim seeking independent relief, he
becomes an actor or profiteer of the judicial machinery and process. If he
then chooses to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination, 4 ' the
court may properly deny him relief and strike the counterclaim. 46
In Von Zamft v. Morton,'47 the plaintiff had taken a voluntary dis-
missal 4 of his complaint. The judge had set aside a day for trial of the
defendant's counterclaim. On the day of the trial, the plaintiff's attorney
moved for an adjournment because his client was out of town and tied up
on business. It was not an abuse of the discretion of the trial court to
render judgment for the defendant on the counterclaim under these cir-
cumstances.
137. Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 184 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966), 19 A.L.R.3d 1067.
138. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.030(b).
139. See p. 470 infra.
140. See Note, The Corporation and the Practice of Law, 21 U. MIAmI L. REV. 889
(1967).
141. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
142. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(b).
143. Murrell v. Murray, 181 So.2d 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
144. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(i).
145. Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964).
146. Nuckols v. Nuckols, 189 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). In this case the wife sued
for separate maintenance and the husband counterclaimed for divorce, but refused to
answer questions concerning an allegedly improper relationship with another woman. The
trial court's decree in favor of the husband was reversed.
147. 185 So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
148. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a).
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If taken literally, Rule 1.170(j) provides that when a demand on a
counterclaim or cross-claim exceeds the jurisdiction of the court where the
action is pending, the entire cause of action will be transferred to another
court of competent jurisdiction. However, in at least two situations, only
the counterclaim will be transferred. First, a complete transfer will be
denied when this would lead to an impractical situation.149 Second, when
a suit is brought in the proper court under a statutory proceeding and the
demand of the defendant's counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of that
court, the cause will not be completely transferred. The original court
will retain jurisdiction of the statutory claim.1
50
F. Cross-claims
Cross-claims against a co-party are permissive but must arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
original claim or a counterclaim.' 5' An entry of judgment on a cross-claim
which alleges that the co-defendant is liable to the defendant for any
amount that the latter might be held liable to the plaintiff should not be
made while an appeal is pending from a final summary judgment in the
main action. In many cases, the outcome of the cross-claim is dependent
upon the disposition of the case in chief. Thus, if the summary judgment
in the main action is reversed, it is obvious that the cross-claim must be
reconsidered. If the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff in such a situa-
tion, the cross-defendant cannot then be liable to the defendant.
15 2
However, the dismissal of a cross-claim with prejudice while the main
action is still pending is a final order and may be immediately appealed.
In a case of first impression, the court stated that all the parties were be-
fore the court, that the extensive evidence should be resolved in one trial
by one jury, and that the entertainment of the appeal would most expedi-
tiously serve the interest of the litigants and efficient administration of
justice. 58
G. Sham Pleadings
When a counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, the cause
should be transferred forthwith to the proper court.'54 However, if the
other party moves to strike the counterclaim as a sham, the rules authorize
the court to which the motion is presented to take evidence and strike the
pleading or enter proper judgments if the pleading is found to be a
sham. 55
149. City of Miami v. Jafra Steel Corp., 184 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
150. State ex rel. Attias v. Blanton, 195 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
151. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g).
,152. Groner v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 179 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
153. Leeward & Hart Aero. Corp. v. South Cent. Airlines, Inc., 184 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1966).
154. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j).
155. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a).
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There is clearly an ambiguity which inheres in these rules. To follow
either rule meticulously would lead to an infraction of the other when the
plaintiff moves to strike as sham a counterclaim which exceeds the court's
jurisdictional amount. In considering the problem, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the immediate concern was to determine the nature of
the pleading and that was to be accomplished by the original court.
Jurisdiction would thereafter be fixed by the ruling." 6
H. Third Party Practice
1. IN GENERAL
Third party practice5 7 came to Florida with the 1965 revision to the
Rules. 5 ' By allowing a defendant, and a plaintiff who is faced with a
counterclaim, to bring in third parties it may be possible to adjudicate all
facets of a cause of action at one time.
Third party practice is not available to a defendant unless the pro-
posed third party defendant is or may be liable to the defendant.'59 The
fact that the proposed defendant may be liable to the plaintiff is not suf-
ficient to invoke the procedure. It is a matter of the trial judge's discretion
as to whether a motion under the rule should be granted. He may require
the defendant to state with" ... preciseness and particularity the grounds,
basis and theory under which the same are required as Third Party De-
fendants," and the appellant must show an abuse of the judge's discretion
to prevail upon appeal.'6
In Hotel Roosevelt Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 6' a Florida appellate
court decided for the first time that an order dismissing a third party com-
plaint with prejudice is immediately appealable as a final order because
the order terminates the cause as between the interested parties. The court
noted that Federal Rule 14 was substantially similar to the Florida Rule
but that federal decisions could not be considered as controlling. Federal
Rule 54(b) permits a federal court to direct final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all the claims involved in a multiple claim action,
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction of final judgment. When Florida adopted
third party practice, no rule similar to Federal Rule 54(b) was adopted.
Thus, the standards are different and federal law cannot control.
It was harmless error for a judge to allow the use of third party
practice prior to the time the rule became effective when the court had
156. City of Miami v. Jafra Steel Corp., 184 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
157. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
158. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1965 Revision, 178 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965).
159. "A third party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in
the action against the third party defendant." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a).
160. Boling v. Barnes, 198 So.2d 377, 378 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
161. 192 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties and any future proceedings
would be governed by the new rule.162
2. "VOUCHING-IN"
Although it is a little noticed and seldom used device, a form of third
party practice has always been available in Florida. In Olin's Rent-A-Car
System, Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels,162a the hotel had been success-
fully sued in a previous action for personal injury. Olin was a licensee at
the hotel whose negligence appeared to have caused the injury. When first
sued, the hotel had advised the rent-a-car company that if it was held
liable in the suit, Olin would then be liable to the hotel. Olin was also
requested to defend the suit but refused to do so.
In holding that the rent-a-car company was liable to indemnify the
hotel, Judge Barns reviewed the common-law history of vouching-in a
third party in an indemnity situation. Generally, the theory covers all
claims for indemnity, express or implied. Vouching-in is appropriate when
a non-party to a suit would be under a duty to indemnify the defendant
for any judgment rendered against the defendant. Of course, the defendant
must give due notice to the non-party, and the judgment may not be ob-
tained with fraud or collusion.
A major difference between common law vouching-in and current
third party practice is that the former may operate beyond state lines in
acquiring jurisdiction over one's person.
I. Amended Pleadings
1. IN GENERAL
Rule 1.190 prescribes the procedures for the amendment of pleadings
and states that leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Florida
courts have generally been liberal in allowing amendments. A judge should
closely examine all of the pleadings and if the insufficiencies of a com-
plaint appear to be such that they may be cured by proper amendments, a
dismissal with prejudice is improper.'
There are, of course, certain circumstances under which a judge
should not allow further amendments. When an amended counterclaim
not only fails to state a cause of action but establishes that no cause of
action exists, the action should be dismissed with prejudice."" If the plain-
tiff has had opportunities to amend his pleadings and has declined to do
so, he is not entitled to amend after the case has been completed and the
judge has announced his decision.1'6 Although the courts are liberal in al-
162. Schmid v. Saphier, 184 So.2d 908 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
162a. 187 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
163. Conklin v. Smith, 191 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
164. Price v. Airlift Int'l, Inc. 181 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
165. Whitman v. Firehouse Drive-Inn, Inc., 193 So.2d 439 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
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lowing amendments, by now the axiom is established that the liberality
gradually diminishes as the case progresses.'
Certain other requirements must be met before a party is entitled to
amend a pleading. For instance, a judge does not abuse his discretion by
denying a motion to amend a complaint when the new complaint is not
submitted with the motion and the motion does not incorporate the ad-
ditional facts or theories of law on which the party would rely to state a




The type of action which is pending may play a role in the judge's
determination as to whether to allow an amendment. In Virginia Mirror
Co. v. Hall,x68 the action was for garnishment. The plaintiff filed an affi-
davit in the action, but it was not in conformity with the statute." 9 After
answering, the defendant moved to quash the writ of garnishment and
pointed out the defects in the plaintiff's affidavit. The trial judge decided
that the amendment would not be in the interest of justice and denied the
motion to amend. The denial was affirmed.
If a plaintiff has no valid cause of action existing at the time of filing
suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of a cause
while the suit is pending. A complaint amended on this basis should be
dismissed with prejudice. 7
Regardless of the situations above-mentioned where the courts have
denied motions to amend, the judicial attitude continues to be liberal
toward allowing the amendment. As an example, in McSwiggan v. Ed-
son, 7 ' the plaintiff brought an action in equity. He was allowed to amend
his prayer once, and then moved to amend by dropping all equitable com-
plaints and moved to transfer the case to the law side. The court properly
granted both motions in the interest of justice.
2. DIVORCE ACTIONS
An interesting situation is developing in Florida which might allow a
party to a divorce action to obtain an in personam divorce against a non-
resident spouse. If a court does have personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant, it can also adjudicate a support claim along with the divorce ac-
tion.' 2 In Kitchens v. Kitchens,7 ' it was held that a wife who sued her
husband for separate maintenance could later amend the complaint so as
to make the action one for divorce. In Gilbert v. Gilbert,'74 a wife who had
166. United States v. State, 179 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
167. Silvers v. Drake, 188 So.2d 377 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
168. 181 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
169. FLA. STAT. § 77.03 (1967).
170. Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
171. 186 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1966).
172. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
173. 162 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
174. 187 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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not lived in Florida for six months served her husband personally in an
action for separate maintenance. 175 The husband answered and returned
to his residence out of the state. After the wife had fulfilled the six-months
residency requirement, 7 ' she was allowed to amend the complaint in
order to seek a divorce on the same grounds as those alleged for separate
maintenance. 177 The motion and notice of hearing were served on the
husband's attorney who moved to quash the amended complaint on
jurisdictional grounds. The motion was denied.
The appellate court held that Florida's liberal attitude toward amend-
ment required only that the amended pleading be based upon the same
specific conduct, transaction or occurrence which the plaintiff tried to
enforce in the original complaint.17 Although there is a due process re-
quirement of notice to the defendant, that requirement is met by service
upon the party's attorney, 7 and there is no need to resort to the con-
structive service statutes. The court originally had personal jurisdiction
over both defendants. The length and character of residence do not affect
jurisdiction over the person, but only jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, when the wife had lived in Florida for six months and amended her
complaint to seek a divorce, the court then had jurisdiction over both of
the parties and the subject matter and could enter any proper judgment. 8 °
3. RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE
When the matter asserted in the amended pleading arises from the
same conduct, transaction or occurrence as that attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading, the amendment should be held to relate back to
the date of the original pleading.' 8 ' If the plaintiff files his complaint in his
own name when it should have been filed in the corporate name, the
amendment will relate back to the original filing date even though the
statute of limitations has run in the intervening period.'82 In certain
situations the plaintiff will be permitted to amend the complaint in order
to insert the name of the proper defendant after the period of limitation
has expired. When the defendant who is served has a close relationship
with the party who should have been served and lulls the plaintiff into a
false sense of security until the statute has run, the amendment will be
held to relate back. 88 However, in an action against a decedent's estate
no amendments to a complaint should be permitted after the expiration of
175. See FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1967).
176. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1967).
177. FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (1967).
178. Keel v. Brown, 162 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
179. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080(b).
180. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 187 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
181. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c).
182. Haines v. Leonard L. Farber Co., 199 So.2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
183. Argenbright v. J.M. Fields Co., 196 So.2d 190 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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the time allowed for filing claims'84 unless the amendment requires no ad-
ditional facts to be proved and the parties in interest and the essential
elements of the controversy remain the same.1 85
It has been held that a pleading filed by a corporation and signed by
its president who is not an attorney is a nullity and cannot be amended.
If the statute of limitations has run in the meantime, it would appear that
the plaintiff has lost the cause of action.'86
VI. PRE-TIUAL PROCEDURES
The Rules require that certain defenses be affimatively pleaded. 87
However, a defendant who fails to so plead may notify the plaintiff of his
intention to do so and have the defense included in a pretrial order.',,
If the plaintiff makes no objection to the order prior to trial, the defense
will be in issue and instructions regarding it may be given by the judge. 8 '
Actions taken by attorneys at pre-trial conferences may be ex-
tremely important as shown by Wabash Life Insurance Co. v. Senitt,190
At the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff offered copies of medical bills, and
the defendant reserved objections as to their relevancy and materiality.
The pre-trial order took note of the objection. At the trial, the defendant
objected to the introduction of the medical expenses on bases other than
materiality and relevancy. The trial judge ruled that the defendant could
make no objection to the evidence except that reserved at the conference.
The ruling was affirmed.
One of the purposes of a pre-trial conference is to limit the number
of witnesses a party is allowed to call.' 9' When a judge so limits the
number of witnesses and one of the parties proposes to call an unscheduled
witness in order to impeach a portion of the opposing party's testimony, it
is not an abuse of the discretion of the judge to sustain an objection to the
witness when the judge feels that the testimony to be impeached is col-
lateral or irrelevant to the issues.9 2
The judge may make attendance at the pre-trial conference manda-
tory on the part of the attorneys. When one of the attorneys does fail to
184. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1967).
185. Grayson v. Maeder, 186 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
186. Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 184 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966), 19 A.L.R.3d 1067.
d87. FA. R. Civ. P. 1.140.
188. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.200(6) provides that one of the purposes of the
pre-trial conference is to consider and determine, "[sluch other matters as may aid the
court in the disposition of the action." In the instant case, the defense considered was that
of contributory negligence.
189. Rice v. Clement, 184 So.2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
190. 181 So.2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
191. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
192. A.A. Holiday Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
See also Hartstone Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Ivancevich, 200 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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attend, the judge may dismiss the suit, strike the answer, or take such
action as justice requires. 1 8 The judge may dismiss a pleading sua sponte.
However, if the plaintiff has previously requested a jury trial and the
defendant's answer has been striken for failure to attend, it is error for




Rule 1.120(a) requires a party to raise the issue of a party's capacity
to sue or be sued by a specific negative averment. A motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant' 95 may not be
utilized in order to raise the question of capacity. 9
In an action for conversion of an automobile which was owned
jointly by a husband and wife, it was not an abuse of the trial judge's
discretion9 7 to order that the wife be joined as an indispensable party. 9 '
In Bonded Rental Agency, Inc. v. City of Miami,19 9 the defendant
filed a cross-claim but did not make proper service of process. The judge
took the following actions: (1) granted the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary final decree; (2) denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment; (3) granted the cross-defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the person, and (4) added the cross-defendant as a
party defendant. In essence, the action was allowed to continue only
between the defendant and the cross-defendant who had not been prop-
erly served, but who could be added as a party in accordance with the
rules.200 The majority affirmed the action because, "the joinder of par-
ties in equity is largely a matter of discretion . .. ."201
VIII. INTERVENTION
At common law, the right to intervene was unknown. Prior to the
latest revision to the Rules, the intervention procedure was contained
only in the rules relating to equity 02 and it was generally held that there
193. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
194. Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc. v. Jay, 183 So.2d 867 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
195. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
196. Seminole Tribe, Inc. v. Courson, 183 So.2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
197. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.250.
198. Scott v. Mico Auto Sales, 187 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); FLA. R. CIv. P.
1.210(a).
,199. 192 So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
200. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), 1.250.
201. Bonded Rental Agency, Inc. v. City of Miami, 192 So.2d 305, 306 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966). The dissent argued that the defendant should pursue the cross-defendant in an inde-
pendent action and that under this decision, litigation might never come to an end. A long
list of cases was cited in support of the statement that, ". . . [Tihe general rule is that
parties may be joined prior to the final decree but may not be joined subsequent to a final
determination of the matter." Id. at 306.
202. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 3.4, 1965 Revision.
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could be no intervention in an action at law."°3 Even under the old rules,
however, an intervention in a law action was recently allowed on the
ground that it would be a waste of judicial effort if the intervention were
not allowed. °4 Under this standard, and with the merger of law and
equity in the new rules, it is probable that intervention at law will be
allowed.
Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may be permitted
to assert his right by intervention.20 5 Whether a party will be permitted
to intervene is within the discretion of the trial judge, and his deter-
mination will not be disturbed absent a showing of clear error.206
In determining whether intervention should be allowed the trial judge
must decide whether the proposed intervenor's interest in the pending
cause is sufficient. In an action for the wrongful death of a minor child,
the mother had received a final judgment when the father who was di-
vorced from the mother attempted to intervene, alleging that the statute
vested the cause of action exclusively in him. 20 7 The court noted that the
mother had the legal custody of the child and was the administratrix of
the child's estate." 8 The court held that the father had no interest in the
litigation or proceeds of recovery and had no right to intervene.0 9
A person does not have sufficient interest to intervene in a condemna-
tion proceeding when he has no specific interest in the property to be
condemned but only other property rights adversely affected by the
action.2 10 Further, a public-spirited citizen or taxpayer has no right to
intervene because of his belief that one side or the other should prevail.2 n
An intervenor is bound by the record made at the time he intervenes.
He cannot contest the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, but is limited
to an assertion of his right to the res. He cannot challenge the sufficiency
of the pleadings or the propriety of the procedure or move to dismiss or
delay without the permission of the court.212
IX. INTERPLEADER
In order for a plaintiff to be entitled to relief by interpleader, he
must apply for that relief before a judgment at law has been rendered
203. Warshaw-Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 85 So.2d 623 (Fla. 1955).
204. Miller v. Townhouse Dev. Corp., 178 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
205. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.230.
206. Wogisch v. Tiger, 193 So.2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
207. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1967).
208. Citing Haddock ex rel. Wiggins v. Florida Motor Lines Corp., 150 Fla. 848, 9 So.2d
98 (1942).
209. Jordan v. Jordan, 187 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
210. Tampa Suburban Util. Corp. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 195 So.2d
568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
211. Charlotte County Dev. Comm'n v. Lord, 180 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
212. United States v. State, 179 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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in favor of any of the claimants to the common fund. 1 It would appear,
however, that if the plaintiff alleges and proves any of the traditional
grounds for a collateral attack on a prior judgment214 in a suit for inter-
pleader and injunction to restrain the enforcement of the judgment, the
action will lie.215
X. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
A. Amendments
A new sentence has been added to Rule 1.390(b), Depositions of
Expert Witnesses. It provides that "A deposition taken under this rule
and any deposition taken of an expert witness under any other rule may
be used in any manner permitted by Rule 1.280(d)." Rule 1.280(d)
prescribes the conditions for use of depositions. In Cook v. Lichtblau,216
the court held that a deposition of the plaintiff's expert witness, taken by
the defendant for discovery purposes, could not be introduced into evi-
dence by the plaintiff when the expert witness was ill 17 because the
plaintiff had not complied with the rules for taking the deposition of an
expert witness. The subcommittee notes indicate that the amendment was
designed to end the confusion resulting from this case 218 and it seems
clear that the courts will now allow such use of expert depositions.
The following sentence has been added to rule 1.410(b):
A party seeking production of evidence at trial which would
be subject to a subpoena may compel such production by serving
a notice to produce such evidence on an adverse party as pro-
vided in Rule 1.080(b). Such notice shall have the same effect
and be subject to the same limitations as a subpoena served
on the party.
The purpose of the amendment is to make the procedure for obtaining
documentary evidence for trial easier. 19
B. Admissions of Fact
Rule 1.370(a) provides that under certain circumstances, if a party
fails to make an admission or denial of fact, or an objection to the re-
quest for admission, the fact shall be deemed admitted. However, when
213. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Evans, 57 Fla. 311, 49 So. 57 (1909).
214. Fraud, collusion, lack of jurisdiction or failure of due process. Goldfarb v. J.A.
Cantor Associates, Inc., 123 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
215. Montgomery v. Travelers Indem. Co., 192 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
216. 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
217. The use of a witness's deposition is normally allowed when the witness is ill.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d) (3).
218. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 637 (Fla.
1966).
219. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598, 637 (Fla.
1966).
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only one member of a partnership answers the request for admissions
on behalf of all the partners, this is not sufficient ground for disregard-
ing the answers and charging the partnership with admissions of all the
facts requested."'
C. The Work Product Concept
In interrogatories 221 to the plaintiff, the defendant asked several
questions relating to the names and addresses of persons who had knowl-
edge of the accident, injuries, disfigurement, physical and mental com-
plaints, disability ratings, etc. Each of the interrogatories began with the
phrase, "In your knowledge or that of your attorney . . . " The court
held that the plaintiff was required to answer the question requiring the
plaintiff and his attorney to give the names and addresses of any per-
sons who had knowledge of the facts of the accident because the Supreme
Court of Florida had previously upheld the validity of such an interrog-
atory.222 However, no answer was required to that portion of the other
interrogatories which requested information within the knowledge of the
attorney. Such information would be merely the impression of the at-
torney and would invade the work product.223
D. Refusal to Make Discovery
Rule 1.380(d) 224 governs the penalties that may be imposed against
a party who wilfully fails to appear for a deposition or answer interrog-
atories. Although the rule is silent on the matter, consistent interpre-
tation now requires that before the penalties may be imposed, the trial
judge must enter an order allowing the defaulting party a fixed amount
of time to comply.25 The judge may not, without entering such an order,
strike the defendant's answer for failure to respond to interrogatories
even when the defendant tenders no valid excuse.
226
After a judge has set a fixed time for response, he may take the
action provided for in the rules. In Southeastern Mobile Homes, Inc. v,
Transit Homes, Inc.,227 the trial judge denied the plaintiff's motion to
strike the defendant's compulsory counterclaim because the defendant
had failed for five months to respond to interrogatories. After a hearing,
220. Siegel v. Raybro Elec. Supplies, Inc., 189 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
221. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.340 provides that interrogatories may relate to any
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 1.230(b).
222. Dupree v. Better Way, 86 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1956).
223. Lopez v. Wallack, 197 So.2d 327 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
224. "[T]he court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading
of that party or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by
default against that party." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d).
225. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20 U.
MniAmi L. REv. 662, 663 (1966).
226. Remington Constr. Co. v. Hamilton Elec., Inc., 181 So.2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
227. 192 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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the judge granted the defendant ten more days to respond. When there
was no response, the court struck the counterclaim. No abuse of discre-
tion was shown.
E. Production of Documents and Things and Subpoena Duces Tecum
An order to produce documents 228 which requires the plaintiff to pro-
duce, ". . any and all photographs, statements, reports, surveys, analy-
sis data or any other data . . . ." dealing with the condition of the
defendant's auto at the time of, or subsequent to, an accident which is the
subject matter of the litigation, is considered to be too extensive and
should be quashed. 229 The items should be set forth with more specificity.
The question of whether good cause2"' is shown is for the trial judge.2 '
Further, the party moving for discovery and production of documents
should specify in his motion, with particularity, the facts he intends to
prove with the documents, 232 since the rule requires that they must con-
tain or constitute evidence before an order for production will be en-
tered.238
Although the documents to be produced should be set forth with
specificity, the description need only be sufficiently certain to enable a
party to comply with the order. The motion for production need not be
verified, and it need not definitely allege that the documents sought con-
stitute admissible evidence since this cannot be ruled upon by the judge
until the trial.234
In a recent decision it was held that a subpoena duces tecum 235 would
run to a party at the time of trial.211 Among the questions left unanswered
by the decision 237 was whether a showing of good cause238 is a prerequisite
for the issuance of the subpoena. In Pembroke Park Lanes, Inc. v. High
Ridge Water Co.,2 39 some of the questions were answered. The party seek-
ing to require a party to produce documents at a trial, need not show good
cause prior to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The party required
to produce may ". . . promptly object by motion prior to the return date
and thereupon, before compliance with the subpoena shall be required, the
228. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350. *See amended R.C.P. 1.410, 211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968)
229. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Elder, 187 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
230. Good cause must be shown before the court will enter an order for production.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
231. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Eider, 187 So.2d 82, 84 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
232. Fryd Constr. Corp. v. Freeman, 191 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
233. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
234. Ormond Beach First Nat'l Bank v. J.M. Montgomery Roofing Co., 189 So.2d 239
(Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
235. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410.
236. Franklyn S., Inc. v. Riesenbeck, 166 So.2d 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
237. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20. U.
MIAmI L. REv. 665, 666 (1966).
238. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
239. 186 So.2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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party causing its issuance must show good cause at a hearing on such
motion."24 The court also held that Rule 1.410 must be read in pari
materia with rule 1.3 50.
Obviously, under this decision, a showing of good cause is a pre-
requisite to the enforcement of the subpoena, but not to its issuance. The
new procedure brought about by the recent amendments to the rules 41 is
the same as that for a motion to produce, and good cause must be shown
prior to the issuance of that order.242
Section 440.33(2) of the Florida Statutes prescribes the procedures
which the Workmen's Compensation Commission must follow when a per-
son neglects or refuses to produce pertinent documents after having been
ordered to do so. The deputy must certify the facts to the appropriate
court (the circuit court) which may then punish as if the failure were a
contempt of the court. It is beyond a deputy's authority to dismiss a
workmen's compensation petition for failure to produce.
243
A private citizen, in contesting his tax assessment, has a right to com-
pel production of the assessor's worksheets and copies of the returns of
persons similarly situated, unless specifically barred by statute.244 The
right exists with regard to tangible property taxes, but not with regard to
intangible property taxes.24 5 A motion to produce is the proper method to
use in order to obtain this information.2 46
F. Scope of Discovery
A deponent may usually be examined regarding any matter which is
not privileged and is relevant 247 to the pending action; it is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible if the information re-
quested appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 48 In the absence of clear error, the appellate court
will not disturb the broad discretion of the trial judge in ruling on objec-
tions to interrogatories2 49 or other discovery procedures.
Pure bill of discovery actions have not been eliminated by the Rules
of Civil Procedure. They have so long been a subject of equity jurisdiction
240. Id. at 87.
241. See p. 478 supra.
242. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350. *See amended R.C.P. 1.410, 211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
243. Kirk v. Publix Super Mkts., 185 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
244. FLA. STAT. § 110.01 (1967).
245. FLA. STAT. § 199.101 (1967).
246. Maxwell v. Pine Gas Corp., 195 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
247. Any interrogatories concerning a private investigator hired by the husband which
require disclosures of communications between the private investigator and the husband or his
attorney need not be answered. Further, any questions which call for a conclusion as to
what may occur in the future are improper. Novack v. Novack, 187 So.2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966).
248. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
249. Disney v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 193 So.2d 657 (Fla. ist Dist. 1967).
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that statutes purporting to give other and simpler means of obtaining the
identical relief are not regarded as ousting the equity jurisdiction unless
there is a clear legislative declaration to that effect.25° There is no such
declaration in the new rules.25'
In a divorce action, it is an abuse of the judge's discretion to grant a
protective order 52 immunizing the husband from pre-trial discovery of his
financial worth, on the basis that the husband has undertaken to answer
any reasonable order for costs, fees or other allowances. 253 This is the case
even when the husband files a written admission or stipulation that he has
assets in excess of five million dollars. The wife and the court are entitled
to know primary, detailed facts instead of secondary, non-verifiable con-
clusions, in order to arrive at a just decision.
254
Particularly when a wife is seeking to establish her rights to property
in which she claims a special equity, the husband may not avoid respond-
ing to interrogatories concerning his financial situation by stipulating that
he will pay any reasonable court order. This is because a husband's
pecuniary ability to pay permanent alimony is an essential element in
making an allowance to the wife in a divorce proceeding.255
In an action for assault, if the allegations of a complaint would
justify allowances of punitive damages, then written interrogatories to the
defendant concerning his financial worth are proper because it is then
relevant to the subject matter involved. The fact that the plaintiff, at the
time of seeking discovery, has produced no evidence to support an award
of punitive damages is immaterial, as he may do so at the trial.
2 6
It is proper in Florida to compel the production of the defendant's
income tax returns in an action where the returns are relevant to the
issues.257 The rule permits the court to order any party to "... produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing ... " of certain
documents and things. 5 " Thus, because of the confidential nature of in-
come tax returns, it is improper to order a party to deliver copies of the
returns to the opposing party's counsel. Provision for the examination of
copies should be made and the confidential nature of the returns should be
reasonably protected. 5 9 Further, the order requiring production is not
enforceable unless it specifies the place and manner for making an inspec-
tion.
2 60
250. First Nat'l Bank v. Dade-Broward Co., 125 Fla. 594, 171 So. 510 (1936).
251. Poling v. Petroleum Carrier Corp., 194 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
252. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b).
253. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1967) ; see 22 U. MIAmi L. REV. 195 (1967).
254. Parker v. Parker, 182 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
255. Novack v. Novack, 187 So.2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
256. Lewis v. Moody, 195 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
257. Parker v. Parker, 182 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
258. FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.350.
259. Fryd Constr. Corp. v. Freeman, 191 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
260. Id. at 490; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
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In a case in which no interrogatories were served, the third district
has held that when interrogatories are appropriately utilized, the answer-
ing party is under an obligation to furnish the propounding party with
any data discovered subsequent to the filing of the original answers if
such data would have been appropriately furnished in the initial an-
swers.261 In this case, the defendant had taken the plaintiff's deposition
and had secured production of certain documents. Subsequently, the
plaintiff had further medical examinations which indicated more serious
injuries. When evidence as to the plaintiff's more serious injuries was in-
troduced at the trial, the defendant claimed surprise. The judge allowed
the evidence and refused to grant a mistrial. In affirming, the appellate
court held that an order for production may be construed to be continuing
in nature only if its wording makes it so. Further, a party cannot claim
surprise if he has not taken steps to protect himself, such as the use of a
pre-trial conference, interrogatories to the plaintiff, a deposition of the
plaintiff's physician or a request that the motion to produce be continuing.
Had interrogatories been propounded, the party would have been under an
obligation to furnish subsequent information.
The instant case leaves many questions unanswered. The holding
concerning the continuing nature of interrogatories was not necessary to
decide the case, and it cannot be stated with certainty what effect it will
have on the other district courts of appeal. However, the court does have
support in the federal decisions262 for this position and it is submitted
that parties, if put on notice, should be required to submit subsequently
obtained data which would have been appropriate for the initial answer.
In obtaining an order to produce which will have a continuing effect,
the question presents itself as to whether the movant will be entitled as of
right to have the proper wording inserted in the order by the trial judge,
or whether a particularly "good cause' 263 must be shown. The practitioner
would do well to request the proper wording in all orders to produce.
G. Use of Depositions
Rule 1.280(d) provides, inter alia, "The deposition of a witness,
whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds . . . . (2) that the witness is at a greater distance than one
hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing . . . ." A difference be-
tween the districts has arisen concerning the kind of proof necessary to
show that a witness is not within the designated radius of the court so
that the deposition may be introduced.
In Haverley v. Clann,264 the trial judge accepted the unsworn state-
261. Passino v. Sanburn, 190 So.2d 61 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), *overruled by R.C.P.
1.340(d), 211 So.2d- (Fla. 1968).
262. Chisholm v. Board of Pub. Educ., 33 F.R.D. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
263. See FrA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
264. 196 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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ment of a party's attorney that to the best of his knowledge, the witness
was more than one hundred miles from the court. On appeal, the second
district held that it was error to admit the deposition on the basis of such
proof, stating that elementary due process required the proof to be in the
form of evidence which is sworn. 265
In Fishman v. Liberty Associates, Inc.,266 the third district was of a
different opinion and held that it was not ground for a new trial that the
witness's absence from the jurisdiction was established by an attorney's
unsworn statement and the deposition was allowed as evidence on this
basis. The court indicated that the trial judge could either require the
attorney to be sworn, or, if opposing counsel does not object, accept an
unsworn statement.
26 7
Rule 1.280(d) (2) allows the use of a deposition of a party by an ad-
verse party for "any purpose," subject, of course, to the normal rules of
evidence. Although the rules allow an adverse party to be called as a
hostile witness, 08 the opposing counsel may choose to introduce the
party's deposition instead, 69 even if the party is available as a witness.
However, in cases where the court has required counsel to call the oppos-
ing party as a hostile witness rather than permitting the introduction of the
deposition and where the questions and answers were the same as those
contained in the deposition, it has been held to be harmless error where no
prejudice was shown.2 70 The same rule also applies, of course, to an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partner-
ship or association which is a party.27' Deputy county tax assessors have
been held to be managing agents for purposes of the rule 27 1
In a case of first impression, the first district has held that when a
party uses part of an opposing party's deposition to impeach his verac-
ity,2 73 the impeached party may introduce the rest of the deposition to
explain and clarify the answers.274 The court followed the federal con-
struction of Rule 26(d) (4).275 Rule 1.280(d)(4) provides that "If only
265. Between the time of the ruling and the time of appeal, it was learned that the
witness, who was thought to be more than one hundred miles away was actually in the
common jail, in close proximity to the place of trial.
266. 196 So.2d 493 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
267. On appeal in this case, it was proved that the witness was actually out of the
jurisdiction.
268. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a).
269. Monsalvatge & Co. v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 151 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
270. Cooper v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 187 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Hill v.
Sadler, 186 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
271. Cooper v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 187 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.280(d) (2).
272. Haines v. Leonard L. Farber Co., 199 So.2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
273. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d) (1).
274. King v. Califano, 183 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
275. FED R. Civ. P. 26(d) (4); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Wray Equip. Corp., 286 F.2d
491 (5th Cir. 1961).
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a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party
may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part intro-
duced, and any party may introduce any other parts." The fact that the
impeaching party did not offer part of the deposition in evidence, but in-
stead used it on cross-examination, is not controlling. It would be against
the spirit and intent of the rules to allow one party to use them in order
to take an unfair advantage of the other party by presenting a half truth
and then objecting to an effort to present the whole truth from the same
evidentiary source.276
H. Place of Taking Depositions
A person desiring to take the deposition of any person shall give rea-
sonable notice of the time and place for taking the deposition 77 but the
court may, upon motion and good cause shown, order that the deposition
be taken only in a designated place other than that stated in the notice.27 8
It has been held2 79 that the plaintiff is required, upon proper notice, to
give his deposition in the forum where the action is pending.280 The court
held that the plaintiff had selected the forum and may be forced to be de-
posed there, regardless of whether he lives and conducts business in the
state.
I. Interrogatories
Normally, a plaintiff may introduce a defendant's answers to inter-
rogatories into evidence. However, the defendant may not use his own
answers as evidence, let alone impart a conclusive character to them. Not
even the ancient device of compurgation went so far; it at least required
the aid of oath takers.28'
When a plaintiff objects to the defendant's attempt to introduce
answers to interrogatories which the plaintiff has served on the defendant,
he must do so at the proper time and for a proper reason. When a plain-
tiff has had ample opportunity in advance of trial to cross-examine persons
giving answers to the interrogatories and has not done so, an objection on
this basis should be overruled. Further, even though answers are based on
hearsay and are self-serving, a motion to strike after both sides have
rested their cases comes too late.282
276. King v. Califano, 183 So.2d 719, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
277. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(a).
278. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b).
279. The court followed the construction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 given
in Irwin Co. v. Tide Publishing Co., 13 F.R.D. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
280. Ormond Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Montgomery Roofing Co., 189 So.2d 239 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1966).
281. Lake v. Konstantinu, 189 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
282. Boutwell v. Bishop, 194 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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XI. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
A. Voluntary Dismissal
The changes of the rules which were made in 1965 to broaden the
plaintiff's right to a voluntary dismissal 83 have been carried over into
Rule 1.420. The plaintiff may take the voluntary dismissal by serving, or
during trial, by stating on the record, a notice of dismissal (except in
actions where property has been seized or is in the custody of the court)
after all of the plaintiff's evidence is completed and the defendant has
moved for a directed verdict." 4 Similarly, the voluntary dismissal may be
taken after all of the evidence is completed and the defendant has moved
for a directed verdict.285 In both cases, the dismissal order should impose
conditions designed to protect the defendant and his counsel from mone-
tary loss occasioned by the dismissal.28
However, it has been held that it is not proper to allow the plaintiff
to take a voluntary dismissal with prejudice against a co-party when the
action might result in a higher award of compensatory damages against
the remaining party who is only derivatively liable.287 In this case, a police
officer and his employer were sued for assault and battery. Originally,
compensatory damages were assessed against the individual defendant in
the amount of 1,227.25 dollars and against the city in the amount of
32,627.25 dollars. A new trial for damages was awarded on the basis that
the city could not be found liable in compensatory damages in excess of
the amount assessed against the active tortfeasor. At the new trial, the
officer was voluntarily dismissed, and the jury awarded 15,000.00 dollars
in compensatory damages. The Supreme Court of Florida held that it was
error to have allowed the dismissal of the police officer, and that ". . . an
action shall not be dismissed at a party's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 288
In Cooper v. Cooper,289 the defendant wife in a divorce action moved
for temporary custody of the minor children. After the court set a date to
hear the motion, the husband filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, but the
judge held the hearing and granted the wife the relief requested and other
relief. The appellate court held that Rule 1.420(a) (2)290 which primarily
relates to counterclaims, was broad enough to sustain the wife's request
283. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAM
L. REV. 641 (1966).
284. Wellons v. Howe, 181 So.2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
285. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Chapin, 179 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
286. Id.; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d).
287. Hutchins v. City of Hialeah, 196 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1967).
288. Id. at 743; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a) (2).
289. 194 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
290. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a) (2) provides that "if a counterclaim has
been served by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's notice of dis-
missal, the action shall not be dismissed against defendant's objections unless the counter-
claim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court."
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for affirmative relief concerning the minor children and preclude the re-
quested dismissal. The court's holding was buttressed by the fact that an
equity court has inherent jurisdiction to protect infants 91 and that section
65.14 of the Florida Statutes grants a court of equity the authority to make
orders concerning children at any stage in a divorce action.
B. Status of the Nonsuit
In Crews v. Dobson,292 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
continued existence of the nonsuit was inconsistent with the Rules of Civil
Procedure.293 In doing so, the court upheld the lower court's disposition
of the case which was to remand the cause to the trial court with instruc-
tions to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute, a disposition which
has not been free from criticism. 94 Since that time, the supreme court295
and other courts290 have held that a decision of a lower court will not be
condemned because it mistakenly refers to a nonsuit instead of a volun-
tary dismissal provided that the requirements for voluntary dismissal have
been generally followed and the effect of the nonsuit is the same as that of
a voluntary dismissal.
The disposition of the Crews case has been followed when it was not
possible to square the purported nonsuit with the requirements for a
voluntary dismissal. In Dade County v. Peachy,297 the plaintiff's attorney
moved for a nonsuit after the jury had retired because he could not help
overhearing the juror discussing an incorrect principle of law. After the
motion was granted and the jury was discharged, but prior to the actual
signing of the order of nonsuit, the defendant moved to dismiss with prej-
udice for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.2 99 The motion was denied.
The Crews case was decided subsequent to this but prior to the time of
appeal. The appellate court held that since the jury had retired299 when
the plaintiff moved for the nonsuit, there was no possible ground for treat-
ing the motion as a voluntary dismissal, and the Crews decision required
a dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute.300 The supreme court
denied the petition for writ of certiorari."'
291. Fisher v. Guidy, 106 Fla. 94, 142 So. 818 (1932).
292. 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
293. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a), 1962 Revision.
294. Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MiAm
L. REv. 594, 644 (1966).
295. Continental Aviation Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 183 So.2d 200 (Fla.
1966).
296. Peaslee v. Michalski, 184 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
297. 181 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
298. See FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b), 1962 Revision.
299. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a) (1).
300. By the time this case reached the appellate court, the 1962 provision of Rule 1.35(b)
relating to dismissal for failure to prosecute had been changed to require a dismissal only
for failure to prosecute over a one year period. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 178
So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965). It would appear that the case could have been remanded with direc-
tions to dismiss without prejudice.
301. The dissenter felt that an error in granting a nonsuit cannot be urged on appeal
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In a subsequent decision 02 the third district, in a case where the non-
suit could have been granted with the same effect as a voluntary dismissal,
remanded the action so the trial judge could determine if the voluntary
dismissal procedure would be appropriate.
If a judge treats a motion for voluntary dismissal as such and dis-
misses without prejudice, stating in his order that he is exercising his dis-
cretion, it is not ground for reversal that a colloquy between the judge and
counsel indicates that the judge felt that the party had an absolute right
to a nonsuit.
303
Hopefully, the problems spawned by the Crews case have now been
fully resolved by the courts.
C. Involuntary Dismissal
Rule 1.420(b) prescribes the grounds for involuntary dismissals. It
provides that after a party has completed the presentation of his evidence
in a case tried without a jury, any other party may move for dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and law no right to affirmative relief has
been shown. Neither the court sua sponte nor the defendant is entitled to
dismiss the plaintiff's case until the plaintiff has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence.3 4 This is true even though the plaintiff's witnesses
appear to uphold the defense to an action. Even if not required by the
rules, it would be contrary to due process of law and fundamental justice
to hold otherwise.30 5
When a defendant, at a pre-trial conference, has admitted liability to
the extent of agreed compensatory damages, justice requires that the
plaintiff be given every opportunity to prosecute the claim. 06 This case
presented a complicated fact situation in which the trial judge ordered
plaintiff to formally elect to try the issue of damages against two de-
fendants (one was in default) or to dismiss with prejudice against the
non-defaulting defendant. When the plaintiff refused to make the election,
the judge entered an involuntary dismissal against him. The appellate
court affirmed the lower court's order, but remanded with directions to
allow the plaintiff to withdraw what the court considered an election not
to proceed.
D. Presenting Defenses in a Motion to Dismiss
Certain defenses may be presented by a motion to dismiss and "the
grounds on which any of the enumerated defenses are based and the sub-
by a defendant who failed to present a motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of prose-
cution in time to preserve the plaintiff's privilege of proceeding with the trial. In this case,
the motion came after the jury was discharged, and the plaintiff had no option to proceed.
302. Sanford v. F.A. Chastain Constr., Inc., 183 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
303. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Chapin, 179 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
304. Rath Co. v. Sun Coast Fruit Co., 186 So.2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
305. Sapp v. Radding, 178 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
306. Sideris v. Warrington Motor Co., 181 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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stantial matters of law intended to be argued shall be stated specifically
and with particularity in the . . . motion. 3 °7 If the trial judge does not
approve of the form or content of the motion to dismiss, he may strike the
motion and grant the party time to file another responsive pleading, not-
withstanding that portion of the rule308 which requires that the defenses
shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party un-
less deferred until trial. If there is error, it is made harmless by the grant-
ing of time in which to file another pleading.30 9
When a dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion310 does not state the grounds for the dismissal, the appellee does not
file a brief with the court, and the complaint does not obviously appear to
fail to state a cause of action, the order may be reversed with instructions
to permit an amended complaint.
3 1 1
Prior to the time that third party practice was permitted in Flor-
ida,3 12 a defendant attempted to serve a third party who he claimed was
liable to him. The claim was dismissed with prejudice. The former de-
fendant then instituted a new action for indemnity against the original
defendant. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings313 and the plaintiff appealed. The court held that while
it was proper in the first action for the court to designate a dismissal as
being with prejudice in order to preclude the claim from being refiled in
that cause, the "with prejudice" designation was no bar to the filing of
the suit in a separate cause or court having jurisdiction.311
When a party is duly served with process in a proper court, the
existence of a prior action in another court does not necessarily show a
lack of jurisdiction, and an action should not be dismissed on that basis.
However, such a situation does present grounds for an abatement, and an
appellate court may treat a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as an abate-
ment.31
5
E. Failure to Prosecute
Rule 1.420(e) substantially incorporates the Florida statute which
requires dismissal of an action if not prosecuted for a one-year period. 16
The dismissal is mandatory and the trial judge has no discretion in the
matter. There need be no "evidentiary showing" before the judge may dis-
miss; it is based solely on the record, and the fact that the action is one
307. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.140(b).
308. Id.
309. City of Miami v. Aeroland Oil Co., 196 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
310. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b).
311. Hunter v. Fairmount House, Inc., 191 Sold 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
312. The procedure was added in the 1965 revision.
313. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(c).
314. Miami Super Cold Co. v. Giffin Indus. Inc., 178 So.2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
315. Cicero v. Paradis, 184 So.2d 212 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
316. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1967). *See amended R.C.P. 1.420(e), 211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
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for a declaratory decree is immaterial. 17 The fact that the United States
is a party defendant does not preclude dismissal for lack of prosecution.818
The question of what constitutes a lack of prosecution is a factual
inquiry. When the only action taken by the plaintiff within the one year
period was to file a motion for substitution of a party plaintiff, the trial
judge did not err by denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. However,
the court limited its holding to a situation where there is no sufficient
showing that the motion was filed as an abuse of the statute because, "this
procedure could be used as a device to extend litigation . . . . When,
during the period considered, the plaintiff has attempted to take the de-
fendant's deposition and moved to strike the defendant's answer the
defendant has left the jurisdiction and his counsel has asked leave to with-
draw, it is error to dismiss the plaintiff's cause for failure to prosecute.82°
Actions dismissed for failure to prosecute may be reinstated for good
cause shown if such a motion is served within one month after the order
of dismissal.821 The "good cause" standard for reinstatement is based
upon evidence and controlled by applicable principles of law and equity,
rather than a standard which is arbitrary in character, and the good cause
must be made to appear in the petition for reinstatement. 2 It is not
ground for reinstatement that the attorney's secretary failed to file certain
documents, or that the judge has kept a motion under advisement for the
one-year period. 23 Out-of-court transactions between the attorneys is not
good cause for reinstatement. 324 However, under certain circumstances,
when an opposing attorney files sham pleadings in order to delay the trial,
reinstatement may be granted.28
F. With or Without Prejudice
In Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet, Inc.,326 the court held
that a dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action is
proper when the insufficiencies of the complaint relate to some inherent
defect in the case as shown by the facts alleged. However, the court held
that if the insufficiency relates to a failure of the complaint to allege the
necessary facts to state a cause of action, prejudicial dismissal is error.
The 1965 amendment to Rule 1.35(b)1 27 was designed to overrule this
317. Newman v. Bennefeld, 193 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
318. Air Control Products, Inc. v. Perma-Stress, Inc., 189 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
319. Green v. Bursten, 197 So.2d 326, 327 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
320. Owens v. Ken's Paint & Body Shop, 196 So.2d 17 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Rosenfeld
v. Glickstein, 200 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1968).
321. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1967) ; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e).
322. Moore v. Gannon, 178 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
323. Conklin v. Boyd, 189 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
324. Moore v. Gannon, 178 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
325. Young v. Pyle, 193 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
326. 154 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
327. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 178 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1965). The rule is now
numbered 1.420.
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decision.3 28 During this Survey period however, the second district con-
tinued to adhere to the Hardee rule in cases which can best be described
as confusing.3 29 However, the court has recognized that the 1966 amend-
ment was designed to replace the doctrine. Thus, in the second district,
orders dismissing causes between September 30, 1962 (the date when the
1962 amendments became effective), and January 1, 1966 (the date when
the 1965 amendments became effective), must be in conformance with the
Hardee decision.33
XII. JURY TRIALS
A. Right to Jury Trial
"The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or by
statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." 3 3' Even if constitu-
tionally guaranteed, however, a party may be held to waive the right if he
does not properly demand it.3 32 Of course, since there was no provision for
jury trials in actions formerly classed as equity, parties will not be en-
titled to such a trial because Florida is now a code pleading state.3 3 When
a defendant files a compulsory legal counterclaim in an action originally
brought in equity, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial for the counter-
claim. However, when the two do not rest upon common issues the proper
procedure is not to transfer the entire cause to the law side, but to resolve
first the equitable issue and then transfer the legal counterclaim.3 34
When a plaintiff has demanded a jury trial and the defendant's
answer is stricken for failure to attend a pre-trial conference, the de-
fendant is still entitled to a jury trial to determine the question of
damages.335
Section 73.101 of the Florida Statutes provides, inter alia, for a single
award of damages by the jury and a subsequent apportionment among the
various parties in interest by the court. In Carter v. State Road Depart-
ment,3 3 6 two defendants moved for separate jury verdicts in a condemna-
tion proceeding, contending that the statute was in violation of the
328. See Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20 U.
MIA.mi L. REv. 594, 646 (1966).
329. Drady v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 193 So.2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966);
Nelson v. Ward, 190 So.2d 622 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
330. Drady v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 193 So.2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
331. FiA. R. CIrv. P. 1.430(a).
332. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d).
333. The situation is the same in the federal courts. See 2 BARRON & HOLTZOF, FED.
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 872, 875 (Wright ed. 1961).
334. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Gerson, 187 So.2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), appeal
dismissed, 192 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1966); see also Fink v. Bluestein, 169 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964); Massey & Westen, Civil Procedure, Seventh Survey of Florida Law, 20 U.
MIAI L. REv. 594, 692 (1966). Compare Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1963)
with 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745, 788-89 (1964).
335. Bader Bros. Van Lines, Inc. v. Jay, 183 So.2d 867 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
336. 189 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1966).
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Florida constitution .33 The supreme court held that the statute was valid
and that the defendants had not been denied their right to a jury trial
since such right did not exist at the time of the adoption of the constitu-
tion.
B. Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
"The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may
order separate trials of any claim ....,38 It is not an abuse of the
judge's discretion to order one jury trial on the issue of liability and
another to decide damages, when one trial for both issues would necessi-
tate holding the jury over the weekend and forcing the plaintiff to incur
additional expenses in order to retain the services of out-of-state expert
witnesses."' When the defendant impeaches the testimony of the plaintiff
in the trial of liability, he may read that portion of the transcript to the
jury in the trial for damages. If the defendant declines to do so, he can-
not be heard to complain that he has been denied his right to a jury
trial."'
C. Verdicts
When a jury returns a verdict awarding punitive, but not com-
pensatory, damages, it is not error for the trial judge to reinstruct the jury
that punitive damages may not be awarded unless there is some compen-
satory damage and resubmit the verdict to the jury. Until a verdict is
received and recorded by the court, it is still within the control of the jury
to correct and alter it in substance if the jury so desires.34' Thus, it is
error for the court to resubmit to the jury only the verdict for compensa-
tory damages without allowing a reconsideration of the punitive award. 42
It is also error for the judge to go into the jury room to hand the
jurors a verdict form and while there to receive a statement from the fore-
man of the jury that the jurors had not previously understood the law as
to compensatory damages.8 48 Although a judgment on a jury verdict
comes to an appellate court with a presumption of correctness, when error
is shown it will be reversed. 8"
A verdict wherein the jury derives the amount of damages based
upon actuarial tables and a per diem amount is not a quotient verdict and
is not a ground for reversal unless the verdict is clearly arbitrary or is so
excessive 45 as to shock the conscience of the court. 46
337. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 3.
338. FLA. R. Cwv. P. 1.270(b).
339. Watts v. Mantooth, 196 So.2d 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
340. Id. at 232.
341. E.g., Tobin v. Garry, 127 So.2d 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). *See R.C.P. 1.481, 211
So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
342. Stevens Mkts., Inc. v. Markantonatos, 189 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1966).
343. Id. at 627.
344. Bull v. Roy, 191 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
345. Excessive and inadequate verdicts are discussed infra, p. 503.
346. Pensacola Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Williams, 193 So.2d 628 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
See Note, 22 U. MiAm L. REV. 729 (1968).
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D. Instructions
The Supreme Court of Florida has authorized the Supreme Court
Committee on Standard Jury Instructions and The Florida Bar Associa-
tion to publish and distribute standard jury instructions.347 In conjunction
therewith, the court amended the rules to include new Rule 1.949.8 which
provides:
The forms of Florida Standard Jury Instructions published
by The Florida Bar pursuant to authority of the Court may be
used by the trial judges of this State in charging the jury in
every civil case to the extent that the forms are applicable, un-
less the trial judge shall determine that an applicable form of
instruction is erroneous or inadequate, in which event he shall
modify or amend such form or give such other instruction as the
trial judge shall determine to be necessary accurately and suffi-
ciently to instruct the jury in the circumstances of the case; and,
in such event, the trial judge shall state on the record or in a
separate order the respect in which he finds the standard form
erroneous or inadequate and the legal basis of his finding. Sim-
ilarly, in all circumstances in which the notes accompanying the
Florida Standard Jury Instructions contain a recommendation
that a certain type of instruction not be given, the trial judge
may follow such recommendation unless he shall determine that
the giving of such an instruction is necessary accurately and
sufficiently to instruct the jury, in which event he shall give such
instructions as he shall deem appropriate and necessary; and,
in such event, the trial judge shall state on the record or in a
separate order the legal basis of his determination that such in-
struction is necessary.
The court approved the theory and technique of the standard instructions,
but made no attempt to adjudicate the legal principles contained therein.
Members of the bar and trial judges retain the right to object to their use.
Although a jury may, at its request, be reinstructed as to part of the
court's charge and although it is not necessary for the court to repeat the
entire charge,849 the trial judge is still the only source from which the
jurors may properly obtain the law or definitions of legal terms. Thus, it
is reversible error for the trial judge to permit the jury to have access to
a dictionary.85 It is also error for the trial judge to give repetitious in-
structions, the effect of which tends to unduly emphasize a particular
aspect of the case. 51
Prior to charging the jury, the judge will accept suggested charges
from the parties and will thereafter hold a conference with counsel to
347. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1967).
348. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 1967).
349. Zanetti v. Weissler, 179 So.2d 383 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
350. Grissinger v. Griffen, 186 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
351. Collins Fruit Co. v. Giglio, 184 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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settle the charge to be given. 5 2 Unless a party objects to an instruction at
such time, he may not assign the giving of the instruction as error on
appeal. 53 When a party has asked for a particular instruction which is
granted and the supreme court, after entry of final judgment but prior to
argument on the appeal, rules that the statute which was the basis of the
instruction is unconstitutional, the party may rely on the holding on
appeal. An appellate court must decide a case according to the law appli-
cable when argument is heard.854
The fact that one instruction was not proper is not necessarily
grounds for reversal. An instruction must be judged in the light of all the
other instructions given and the pleadings and evidence in the case. If the
law appears to have been fairly presented to the jury an assignment of
error based upon one instruction will not prevail. 55
E. Prejudicial Remarks Before the Jury
In Port Everglades Terminal Company v. Trans-Continental Traffic
Service Bureau, Inc., 56 the plaintiff had alleged conspiracy of two de-
fendants. Each attorney cross-examined the other's client, but not his own.
The judge commented unfavorably upon this procedure before the jury.
On appeal, the court held that remarks of a trial judge accusing a lawyer
of unfairness or holding him up to contempt was reversible'error, par-
ticularly where the case involved an alleged conspiracy.
An attorney's remark in closing argument that if the jury allows cer-
tain damages, "then you are asking for it," may reasonably be interpreted
as an appeal to the jury's passion or prejudice. However, such a remark




When a party moves for a continuance38 and sets forth proper
grounds warranting it, the trial judge abuses his discretion by condition-
ing the granting of the motion upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.
This is, in effect, placing a monetary value upon the party's day in court
and cannot be condoned. 59
352. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.470(b).
353. Sharpsteen v. Keesler, 178 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
354. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Rouse, 194 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1966). In this case, the
defendant asked for an instruction on comparative negligence which was permitted by
Florida Statutes, section 768.06 (1965). The statute was later declared unconstitutional.
355. Keyser v. Brunette, 188 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
356. 185 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
357. Clark v. Yellow Cab Co., 195 So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
358. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.460.




A party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by the adverse party without waiving the right to offer evidence
if the motion is denied. 6° However, if the moving party does present
evidence after the denial, he has waived any error in the ruling, and if the
defendant then renews the motion at the completion of all the evidence
the judge's ruling must be based on a consideration of all the evidence, not
just that presented by the plaintiff.8 1 If the defendant's renewed motion
is also denied, the district court may not hold that the trial court erred in
failing to grant both of the defendant's motions if the appellate court has
before it only the record of the plaintiff's evidence. Since the trial court's
possible error in denying a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence may be cured by subsequent testimony, ". . . the appellate record
was obviously insufficient to permit such a determination .... by the
district court of appeal.3 62
The purpose of a directed verdict is to conclude a trial when there is
no evidence whatever that could, in law, support a verdict for the party
opposing the motion.363 If the evidence is conflicting and permits different
reasonable inferences864 or if the plaintiff has alleged and shown at least
one fact which might lead to recovery, 65 the issue should go to the jury.
For purposes of the motion, the court must interpret all evidence in favor
of the party opposing the motion,866 giving him the benefits of all reason-
able intendments, inferences and deductions. 7 The party who moves for
the directed verdict admits all facts proved and every conclusion favorable
to an adverse party that a jury might reasonably draw from the facts. 8
In Wilson v. Bailey-Lewis-Williams, Inc.,869 the plaintiff sued for
two claims of injury. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the judge
granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict, but subsequently
entered a final judgment which transferred one of the claims to the civil
court of record. On appeal, the court did not find it necessary to rule on
this procedure because the directed verdict was reversed. The court indi-
cated that if a plaintiff fails to make a prima facie case for one of two in-
juries, the proper procedure would be to strike the evidence presented on
this issue and instruct the jury accordingly.
360. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.480.
361. 6551 Collins Ave. Corp. v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1958).
362. Gulf Heating & Refrigeration Co. v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 193 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1966).
363. Paikin v. Beach Cabs, Inc., 187 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
364. John B. Reid & Assoc. v. Jimenez, 181 So.2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
365. Reeves v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 191 So.2d 307 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
366. Scott v. Davis, 188 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
367. Paikin v. Beach Cabs, Inc., 187 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
368. Wilson v. Bailey-Lewis-Williams, Inc., 194 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
369. 194 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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B. Presumptions
In Hill v. American Home Assurance Co.,870 the plaintiff sued as ad-
ministratrix of the estate of her husband to recover upon an accidental
death insurance policy. The husband had died as a result of being shot
with his own rifle while alone, and the defendant alleged that the deceased
had committed suicide. The plaintiff's evidence showed that the deceased
had been in good spirits prior to his death and that there was no motive
for suicide. A gunsmith testified that the weapon could be fired acciden-
tally. The judge directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence. The appellate court held that, "The rule in this juris-
diction seems to be that when 'some' substantial, competent evidence is
introduced consistent with the theory of accidental death, a presumption
of law arises that it was not suicide." 3 7' Since the plaintiff's evidence when
combined with the presumption, was sufficient to raise a prima facie show-
ing of accidental death, the directed verdict was error.
C. Reserved Directed Verdict (judgment n. o. v.)
When a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence
is denied, the judge is deemed to have reserved a decision, and the movant
may renew the motion within ten days after the reception of a jury ver-
dict.172 The practice of reserving the ruling on the motion until after the
jury has submitted its verdict even though the trial judge has previously
decided that the motion should be granted is commended. In the event
that the appellate court should reverse the judge's ruling, it would not be
necessary to retry the action as the jury's verdict could be reinstated. 3
When a jury is unable to come to a conclusion and a mistrial is de-
clared, the party who has previously moved for a directed verdict may,
within ten days, move for judgment in accordance with the previous mo-
tion, and it is not error for the trial judge to grant the motion.
87 4
The validity of a judgment n.o.v. must be tested by the rules appli-
cable to a motion for a directed verdict; the only difference between the
two is that the former is entered after the jury has returned its verdict.175
Such a judgment should not be entered unless no evidence is presented on
which a jury could lawfully return the verdict it has rendered.3 76
An order granting a motion for a new trial in the event that a judg-
ment n. o. v. is reversed is authorized under Rule 1.480(c).
77
370. 193 So.2d 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
371. Id. at 642.
372. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.480(b).
373. Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
374. Hall v. Container Corp. of America, 189 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
375. Smith v. Peninsular Ins. Co., 181 So.2d 212 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965).
376. Morgan v. Collier County Motors, Inc., 193 So.2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
377. Aucompaugh v. City of Punta Gorda, 181 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.480(c).
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XV. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A single default rule, Rule 1.500, has taken the place of former rules
2.9, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. The Committee Notes indicate that the only sub-
stantial difference between the new rule and federal rule 55378 is that the
clerk is now forbidden to enter a default against a party who has ap-
peared. The court is required to enter such a default. 9 The major differ-
ences between the new and the old rules are that: (1) The new rule pro-
vides for setting aside defaults in accordance with the rule providing
relief from judgments;3"' (2) In decree pro confesso (which is not men-
tioned in the new rule) a party is not specifically authorized to proceed
ex parte after a default; (3) There is no longer a ten-day limit for a party
to move to have a decree pro confesso set aside; (4) There are no pro-
ceedings in lieu of a decree pro confesso contained in the new rule.
In Carroll's Inc. v. DeBarros,381 when the defendant did not answer,
the clerk entered a default and the judge entered final judgment thereon.
Twenty-one days later the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action and to vacate the judgment. The defendant also sub-
mitted an affidavit which controverted the allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint. The judge vacated the judgment but not the default and
granted the defendant time in which to answer. On appeal, the court held
that there was no abuse of discretion in setting aside the final judgment,
but the judge was in error in allowing the defendant to plead to the merits
since he was entitled only to notice of application for final judgment and
an opportunity to be heard on the question of damages."8 '
Where damages are unliquidated, the defendant against whom de-
fault has been entered for failure to answer is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the trial for damages.38 3
XVI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A. Summary Judgment
1. IN GENERAL
A party seeking any relief in an action may move for summary judg-
ment after twenty days from the commencement of an action or after
service of such a motion by the adverse party; 84 the defending party may
378. FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
379. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 187 So.2d 598, 638 (Fla. 1966).
380. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540.
381. 182 So.2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
382. It is submitted that this decision would be difficult to square with the rules as they
then existed. Suffice it to say that the procedures would be very different today under Rule
1.500.
383. Harbour Tower Dev. Corp. v. Seaboard Equip. Co., 179 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
384. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a).
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move for summary judgment at any time. 85 Such a judgment should be
rendered only when pleadings and papers on file show that there is no
genuine issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.386
The burden of the party moving for summary judgment is a heavy
one because the only question considered is the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact,387 and the movant must demonstrate an absence of
such an issue. 388 All factual doubts must be resolved against the moving
party,88 9 and if the judge has the slightest doubt as to the propriety of
granting the motion, it should be denied. 90 The judge must also exclude
from consideration all facts which would be inadmissible as evidence.8 91
For purposes of the motion the court is not permitted to consider the
weight of the evidence, credibility of the witnesses or a party's chances of
success at trial.392
The rule that a motion for summary judgment should not be granted
before the defendant has answered unless it is clear that an issue of mate-
rial fact cannot be presented should be applied to the situation where the
defendant has moved to dismiss the cause of action prior to answering. 93
Issues of negligence and contributory negligence are not ordinarily
susceptible to summary disposition even when the evidence is not in dis-
pute,8 94 and where the questions are close, doubt should always be re-
solved in favor of a jury trial. 8 The fact that both parties have moved
for summary judgment is not conclusive on the judge that there is no
genuine material issue of fact.896
Rule 1.510(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, if
practicable, the judge shall, on a motion for summary judgment, ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what facts
are in good faith controverted and enter an order specifying the two
categories. The Author's Notes to the rule indicate that such an order is
mandatory.8 97 The federal counterpart of the rule is similarly inter-
preted.398 However, when the record does not indicate that it is practicable
385. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b).
386. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
387. Lake v. Konstantinu, 189 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
388. McNulty v. Garvey, 189 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
389. Enix v. Diamond T. Sales & Serv. -Co., 188 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
390. Stone v. Hamic, 189 So.2d 908 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
391. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
392. White v. Pinellas County, 185 S6.2d 468 (Fla. 1966); Strode v. Southern Steel
Constr. Co., 188 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Miami Beach Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 183 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
393. Casteel v. Malisch, 189 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
394. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
395. Strickland v. Bradford County Hosp. Corp., 196 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
396. Central Inv. v. Old S. Golf Util. Corp., 197 So.2d 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
397. 31 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55 (1967). The predecessor to the rule was numbered 1.36(d).
398. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d); 6 MOORE, FEoaa PRACTIcE 2756 (2d ed. 1965).
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for the judge to enter such an order, and neither party requested it in
his motion to dismiss, an appellate court cannot say that it was prac-
ticable for the judge to enter the order and reverse on the ground that it
was not entered. 99
2. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In Holl v. Talcott,"0 a medical malpractice action, the defendants
moved for summary judgment and supported the motion with affidavits
which generally alleged that medical services performed for the plaintiff
had been in accordance with established medical standards. The plaintiff
filed an affidavit signed by an out-of-state physician which indicated mal-
practice. The plaintiff's affidavit was stricken for legal insufficiency and
the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The action
was affirmed by the district court of appeal.
On certiorari, 401 the Supreme Court of Florida held that before it
becomes necessary to consider the legal sufficiency of affidavits or evi-
dence submitted by the party moved against for summary judgment, the
movant must conclusively prove that there is no genuine issue of material
fact.402 Merely supporting the motion by affidavits or factual showings is
not enough to shift the burden to the party opposing the motion and re-
quire him to show that a factual issue does exist. 3 The court also held
that in a malpractice case, the defendant's affidavits are not enough in
themselves to show that there are no remaining issues of fact, for they
do not explain what caused the plaintiff "to be reduced to the vegetable
state so as to remove all doubt that the result was caused by their negli-
gence as claimed by the petitioner. 40 4
When the party moving for summary judgment attaches affidavits
and exhibits to his motion in support of his request and the other party
does nothing, this cannot be ground for granting the summary judg-
ment. 05 The rules authorize affidavits by a party against whom summary
399. O'Brien Assoc., Inc. v. Tully, 184 So.2d 202 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
400. 171 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). See note, 22 U. MLun L. Rav. 424 (1967).
401. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
402. This point was followed in reversing another medical malpractice action in which
summary judgment for the defendant had been affirmed. Scanlon v. Litt, 191 So.2d 553
(Fla. 1966). The situation arose again, and the court, evidently in the hope of finally mak-
ing its point, stated in another action for malpractice, "... the burden of a party moving
for summary judgment is greater, not less, than that of the plaintiff at trial. . . . [T~he
party moving . ..must show conclusively that no material issues remain for trial." Visin-
gardi v. Tirone, 193 So.2d 601, 604 (Fla. 1966) ; accord, Thompkins v. Rosenburg, 194 So.2d
688 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) ; Deehl v. Sparks Constr. Co., 191 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
403. If the movant does meet his burden and the opposing party does not come forward
and demonstrate a real issue between the parties, summary judgment will be affirmed. Mor-
ton v. Mastan Co., 181 So.2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
404. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 45 (Fla. 1966).
405. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Lord, 189 So.2d 534 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1966).
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judgment has been sought °6 but do not require them. A party who is so
moved against has no duty whatsoever to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of fact until after the movant has shown there is none. 0
Thus, if the moving party's affidavits or exhibits show an issue of fact or
there is otherwise such an isue, the motion for summary judgment should
be denied.
40 8
It would appear that "sufficient evidence" is no longer enough to sup-
port the motion; only conclusive evidence will now suffice.4" 9
3. RAISING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
An affirmative defense may be raised only by following the proper
procedures. 10 The rules make no provision for raising an affirmative de-
fense in a motion for a summary judgment. Thus, if the defendant is
permitted to raise the questions of the statute of limitations and estoppel
in such a motion, prior to the time that an answer to the complaint has
been filed, it is reversible error.4 1' However, when the defendant alleges a
full release and attaches a copy of it to his answer, he may then raise the
defense in a motion for summary judgment. If the plaintiff does not deny
the release, he has in effect admitted a complete bar to his action, and no
genuine issue of fact exists.41 2
A different situation exists when the party moved against denies the
affirmative defense, and it is error to grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations has run if
there is a question as to whether the statute has tolled because the de-
fendant has been out of the jurisdiction. 13 When the party moving for
summary judgment pleads the wrong statute of limitations, it is error for
the trial court to correct the pleading and grant a motion for summary
judgment on this basis. However, the party should be given an opportun-
ity to amend.
414
Entry of summary judgment for the defendant is proper when only
the plaintiff's unsworn complaint, which alleges an estoppel, controverts
the defendant's allegation that the statute of limitations has run. The
plaintiff should either file a sworn complaint or file affidavits in opposition
to the motion.1 5
406. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
407. Hix v. Sirkis, 190 So.2d 207 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
408. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Earle W. Day Co., 190 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
409. See Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
410. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110, 1.140.
411. Meigs v. Lear, 191 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
412. Biscoe v. Evans, 181 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
413. Levy v. Kirk, 187 So.2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
414. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Travelers Indem. Corp., 190 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966).
415. A. & G Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. Johnson, 192 So.2d 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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4. FACTUAL QUESTIONS PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
There are certain factual situations which almost always preclude
the entry of a summary judgment, and there are other situations which
must of necessity be decided by a jury. In the former area are close cases
of negligence and contributory negligence,4 16 and cases involving com-
plicated testimony, pleadings and proof.4 1 In the latter category fall
cases such as those where the relationship of the parties is in issue. The
question of whether the defendant is the collection agent for, or the
debtor of, the plaintiff is plainly one for the jury when each party alleges
a different relationship.4 1
When a defendant has, without dispute, violated a statute while being
involved in an accident, the jury could draw conflicting inferences and
there is a genuine issue of fact.419 Only if the violation could not have in
any way been the cause of the accident or have contributed to it, is the
violator entitled to a summary judgment.2 °
The credibility of a witness may often be the determining factor in
a trial, and for purposes of a motion for summary judgment, the judge
may not determine this." Thus, when an affiant who is interested in the
action states that he acted under the direction of his superior who is now
deceased and the statement cannot be contradicted, the issue must go to
the juryY2 The same result occurs when the record title holder of an
automobile alleges that a sale was made prior to the accident to the person
who was driving the vehicle and was killed in the accident."
Certain facts must be proved in a specified way or they will not be
admitted. In an action for debt on a foreign judgment, the existence of
the judgment must be proved in the manner provided for by statute
4 4
and a motion for summary judgment granted on the basis of a foreign
creditor's affidavit is an error. 5
5. SHAM PLEADINGS
Rule 1.150(a) provides that a party may move to strike a pleading as
sham, and if sustained, the court may in its discretion enter summary judg-
416. Vernatte v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967); Bailey v. Wilson,
180 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
417. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
418. DeBoliac Truck Equip. Co. v. Earl Wallace Ford, Inc., 188 So.2d 877 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1966).
419. McNulty v. Garvey, 189 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
420. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
421. St. Johns v. Michaels, 178 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
422. Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Miami Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 183 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1966).
423. St. Johns v. Michaels, 178 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
424. FiA. STAT. § 92.032 (1967).
425. Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 178 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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ment on the merits against the sham pleader. In U. S. 1-163rd Street
Corporation v. Gerardo,42 6 the defendant entered a general denial. After
taking the defendant's deposition, the plaintiff moved to strike the plead-
ing as sham and for summary judgment. The granting of the motion was
held to be proper.
6. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVITS
A party may move for summary judgment with or without supporting
affidavits, 27 and the party moved against may serve opposing affidavits
prior to the day of hearing on the motion.428 The affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. 42 9
For a party to present a legally sufficient affidavit of an expert wit-
ness in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary
that the affidavit contain all the details and formalities required to offer
the testimony into evidence at trial, although the evidentiary matter pre-
sented must be relevant and competent.480 Further, the rule requiring that
matters set out in the affidavit be admissible into evidence does not re-
quire that a party make out his whole case before the affidavit is ad-
missible. If some of the facts set out are not inadmissible in that they
fall outside the bounds of the complaint, are privileged, or are hearsay,
etc., then these facts should not cause the affidavit to be declared legally
insufficient.4"'
In Visingardi v. Tirone,3 2 the physician's affidavit filed by the
plaintiff in opposition to a motion for summary judgment was stricken
on the ground that it showed no causal relationship between the defend-
ant's actions and the decedent's death. The court held that the causal
relationship is a genuine fact question itself, and the movant is under an
obligation to prove an absence of this relationship. Thus, an affidavit of
a party opposing the motion cannot be legally insufficient on this basis un-
less the movant has first clearly shown that the relationship does not
exist.433
An affidavit is legally insufficient when it contains assertions which
are contrary to the natural laws, common knowledge or clearly incom-
patible with the circumstances of the case.434
426. 189 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
427. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a),(b).
428. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
429. FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.510(e).
430. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
431. Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1966).
432. 193 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1966).
433. Id. at 604.
434. Watley v. Florida Power & Light Co., 192 So.2d 27 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In an action upon a negotiable instrument, section 52.08 of the
Florida Statutes provides that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove
consideration unless the same is impeached by the defendant under oath.
When a defendant files an unsworn answer alleging a lack of considera-
tion, the plaintiff is under no obligation to prove that fact. It is not suf-
ficient that the defendant later files a sworn affidavit in support of a
motion for summary judgment. First, the statute has been held to be in-
voked only by an answer.435 Second, if the motion for summary judgment
is denied, the motion would drop out of the case leaving the record in the
same condition as if no motion had been filed.4"6 Under these circum-
stances, the affidavit is legally insufficient.3 7
7. APPELLATE REVIEW
An order on a motion for summary judgment which in effect dis-
misses one count of the appellant's complaint is not immediately appeal-
able, but may be reviewed on an appeal from an entry of final judg-
ment.
438
When the trial judge's order granting summary judgment for the
defendant indicates that the judge has considered the plaintiff's answer
and replies to interrogatories, and the plaintiff on appeal does not file a
record containing the matter considered by the trial court, nor request
the clerk to file such material, the judge's discretion will not be dis-
turbed.49 However, when there were no depositions, admissions or af-
fidavits before the trial court and nothing in the record to show that the
movant proved his case, an entry of summary judgment was reversed.440
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
"After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."44 The
motion is quite similar to that for a summary judgment and the material
allegations of the opposing party's pleadings are taken as true while all
allegations of the movant's pleadings which have been denied are taken
as false. When a defendant has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, and the motion has been denied, and
the defendant thereafter raises an affirmative defense in his answer, it is
error for the judge to then immediately grant the defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Since the function of such a motion is to raise
questions of law arising from the facts, it is obvious that the defendant's
435. Mayflower, Inc. v. Suskind, 112 So.2d 394 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
436. McSwiggan v. Edson, 186 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1966).
437. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Marger, 184 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
438. Jacobs v. Gould, 197 So.2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). *Overruled by F.A.R. 4.2(a),
211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
439. Althouse v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 183 So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
440. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tunon, 179 So.2d 382 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
441. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(c).
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affirmative defense must be proved, and if the complaint was held to state
a cause of action, there are remaining fact questions which preclude the
entry of judgment on the pleadings.442
The rules do not provide for a partial judgment on the pleadings,
and it is error for the judge to enter such an order which does not fully
dispose of the case.
44 3
XVII. NEW TRIAL MOTIONS
A. In General
The rules provide for motions for new trials or rehearings on any or
all of the issues, if the motion is served within ten days or on the court's
own motion.444 Most of the recent litigation in this area has involved the
standard by which an appellate court will review the trial judge's order
granting or denying a new trial.
Several cases have recently held that when the judge allows a case
to go to the jury and there is evidence in the record supporting its verdict,
and no prejudicial conduct, it is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion
to grant a motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury verdict is con-
trary to the weight of the evidence.44' The rationale is that a jury verdict
is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and that the jury, not the
court, is the trier of the facts.446
Other cases have disagreed with this approach. In Danek v. Hoff-
man," the court held that the "substantial evidence rule" as espoused
by the above-mentioned cases has been disapproved by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Cloud v. Fallis,448 a leading case on the subject. The
court stated that the "sound discretion rule" is the proper method of de-
ciding such cases. If the judge grants a new trial on the basis that the
jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, his discretion should
not be disturbed unless very clearly in error. 449 The court admitted that
under this doctrine it was difficult to find a standard by which to test the
judge's discretion, but asserted that this was nevertheless the present rule
in Florida.
When the judge's order granting a new trial is on the basis that the
weight of the evidence is contrary to the jury verdict, his discretion is
more conclusive on the appellate court than when the order is based on
442. Wagner v. Wagner, 196 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
443. Bolen Int'l, Inc. v. Medow, 191 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
444. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.530.
445. Smith v. Peninuslar Ins. Co., 181 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
446. Mansell v. Eidge, 179 So.2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
447. 189 So.2d 893 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
448. 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959).
449. Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Singletary, 190 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Cross v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 190 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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a non-evidentiary ground.5 0 This distinction is made because the ap-
pellate court is poorly equipped to weigh evidence, but when the grant of
a new trial is based on a question of law, the reviewing court is on a more
nearly equal footing with the trial judge.45' On this basis, when the judge
refused to permit the plaintiff's counsel to argue last clear chance in a
rebuttal to the defendant's closing argument concerning contributory
negligence after the question of last clear chance had been raised by the
testimony and an instruction thereon was given, it was prejudicial error.
The granting of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was not error.452
The courts also generally hold that a stronger showing is required to
reverse an order granting a new trial than to reverse an order denying a
new trial.453 In an action for damages to the plaintiff's aircraft allegedly
caused by the negligence of the defendant, if there is no evidence con-
cerning the ownership of the airplane which allegedly caused the damage,
there is a vital deficiency in the case, and it is error to deny the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial.454
In evidentiary matters, the trial judge must decide whether an ap-
peal to the passion or prejudice of the jury has been prejudicial enough
to warrant a new trial, and his discretion is seldom disturbed. In one case,
plaintiff's counsel remarked to the jury that the defendant had spent
three hours in a bar prior to the accident, and the judge sustained an ob-
jection to the statement. It was not clearly apparent that the jury had
been influenced by passion or prejudice, so the judge's denial of the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial was not erroneous. 5 Further, when coun-
sel intimates in his closing argument that the judge also feels that the
defense is phony, it is not error to grant the defendant's motion for a new
trial.456 However, it is error for a judge to grant a new trial on the basis
that the horror of testimony concerning blood prejudiced the jury when
the action is one for wrongful death allegedly caused by a hospital in-
jecting the wrong type of blood into the decedent. Such a trial cannot be
conducted without testimony concerning blood and its effect on the human
body when mismatched.
4 7
It is error for a trial judge to strike a motion for a new trial when it
is filed within ten days of the rendition of final judgment, but the error is
harmless if it would have been improper to grant the new trial.458
450. Boutwell v. Bishop, 194 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
451. 'Collins Fruit Co. v. Giglio, 184 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
452. Id.
453. Pemberton v. Keel, 195 So.2d 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
454. Atlantic Aircraft Corp. v. English, 198 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
455. Knuck v. Willoughby, 198 So.2d 839 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
456. Matthews v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 190 So.2d 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
457. Ward v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 193 So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
458. American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Southern Indus. Sav. Bank, 196 So.2d 770
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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An appellant who files a notice of appeal before the entry of an order
denying his motion for a new trial is deemed to have waived or abandoned
the motion and vested jurisdiction in the appellate court.459
During this Survey period, the courts continued to follow strictly
the requirement of Rule 1.530(f) and Florida Statutes, section 59.09(4)
that orders granting new trials must recite the grounds therefor. If the
requirement is not met, the order will be reversed.4 60
B. Excessive or Inadequate Damages
Damages for mental pain and suffering must bear some reasonable
relation to the facts of the case, status of the parties, amount allowed as
other compensatory damages and the philosophy and general trend of
decisions affecting such cases. When a sixty-eight year old unemployed
female is allowed six thousand dollars in other compensatory damages and
nearly seventy-two thousand dollars in damages for pain and suffering,
the amount is clearly excessive and a remittitur or a new trial for damages
should have been ordered by the trial judge.
461
When a judge orders a new trial and the order contains general state-
ments to the effect that the judicial conscience was shocked because of
excessive damages, the jury did not understand the charge, etc., these
statements must find a basis in the record or an abuse of discretion in
granting the new trial is indicated.46
When the jury's verdict is so inadequate as to shock the conscience
of the court, it is generally held that the trial judge's order granting a new
trial will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
463
A different situation arises when the judge agrees with the verdict and
refuses to grant a new trial for inadequate damages.
In Roberts v. Bushore,464 the court, purportedly relying on supreme
court opinions, 465 affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for a new
trial which alleged that the damages awarded were grossly inadequate.
The court indicated that it was powerless to set aside the order because
the supreme court's rulings had created a rule that grossly inadequate
damages will ".... not be set aside for the mere reason that they are less
than the court thinks they should be." It must be shown that the verdict
was "induced by prejudice or passion, some misconception of the law or
459. Perez v. City of Tampa, 181 So.2d 571 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
460. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mary Boutique, Inc., 198 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967);
Hall v. American Distrib. Corp., 181 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). *Overruled by R.C.P.
1.530(P), 211 So.2d - (Fla. 1968).
461. Smith v. Goodpasture, 179 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
462. Ward v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 193 So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
463. Sutton v. Logan, 184 So.2d 662 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966).
464. 172 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
465. Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1964) ; City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So.2d
748 (Fla. 1964) ; Shaw v. Puelo, 159 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1964).
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.. . that the jury did not consider all the elements of damage involved,
missed a consideration of the issues submitted or failed to discharge their
duty .. .
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the above-mentioned de-
cision.467 The court stated that:
Our decisions ... were not intended to indirectly preclude a re-
view by the District Courts of Appeal of verdicts challenged for
inadequacy. We reiterate that a verdict for grossly inadequate
damages stands on the same ground as a verdict for excessive or
extravagant damages ..... [N] either the trial court nor the Dis-
trict Court is precluded from disturbing a verdict which as an
end result is so grossly inadequate that it shocks the conscience
of the court.468
The district court of appeal was directed to reconsider the case in the
light of these principles.
On remand,469 the appellate court again affirmed the trial court's
denial of a new trial. Judge Wigginton again reviewed the opinions of the
supreme court and came to the conclusion that:
[T]he Supreme Court, by its several decisions ... intended to
promulgate a rule of law to the effect that although a trial judge
has the privilege and duty . . . to set aside a jury verdict and
grant a new trial under proper circumstances, such duty and
privilege may be exercised by district courts of appeal only un-
der exceptional circumstances not yet clearly defined by the
decisional law of this state.47
The judge indicated that for all practical purposes an appellate court could
not now determine whether a new trial should be granted on the ground of
inadequate damages, and the lower court's judgment was reaffirmed.
When the jurors and the trial judge agree that the damages are
adequate, the appellate court will not overturn the judge's denial of a
motion for a new trial.
47 '
In a negligence action when a wife sues for damages related to her
injuries and the husband sues for past, present and future medical ex-
penses incurred as a result of the wife's injuries and for loss of society
and consortium, it seems clear that a jury verdict which finds for the
wife against the defendant and assesses damages, and also find for the
husband but allows no damages, is in error. This is true whether the
466. Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154, 157, 200 So. 376, 377-78 (1941).
467. Roberts v. Bushore, 182 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1966).
468. Id. at 402.
469. Roberts v. Bushore, 183 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
470. Id. at 711.
471. Miller v. James, 187 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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verdict indicates zero damages47 2 or the verdict form is left blank in the
space where the husband's damages should be awarded. 7 In both situa-
tions, the denial of the husband's motion for a new trial is error. It
would appear that the jury has failed to consider all of the elements of
damages.4 74 Further, when the wife receives a jury verdict for damages
and the husband has sued only for loss of society, services and consortium
and received no award, a new trial should be granted.
475
C. Rehearing
The presumptions which favor the non-movant in a summary judg-
ment proceeding must be applied throughout the entire consideration of
the motion and should attend a motion for rehearing. The trial judge's
discretion to deny the rehearing is narrowed in the summary judgment
area.
476
In Pensacola Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Costa, 7 it was held that
with respect to cases tried without a jury, an order granting a rehearing
need not set out particular and specific grounds relied upon. The movant
is not challenging the integrity of a jury verdict and an order granting
such a rehearing does not necessitate impaneling a new jury as does an
order granting a new jury trial. Thus, there is no more reason for a trial
judge to state the reasons for granting the rehearing than there was under
former practice in an equity action.
XVIII. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, DECREES OR ORDERS
Most of the decisions interpreting Rule 1.540 have concerned either
the procedure used to invoke the rule or whether the party's actions en-
title him to relief.
A divorce decree may be set aside under the rule if the proper pro-
cedure is followed, 478 but a party is not precluded from bringing an in-
dependent action for the purpose of setting aside the decree.479
In a case of first impression it was held that when a trial judge inad-
vertently enters a summary final decree, he may, sua sponte, vacate the
judgment 8 ° because it was entered by "mistake" or "inadvertence." 48'
472. Fejer v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 182 So.2d 438 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
473. Correll v. Elkins, 195 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
474. Id.
475. Grant v. Williams, 190 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
476. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1966).
477. 195 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
478. Vega v. Vega, 110 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
479. Corrigan v. Corrigan, 184 So.2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
480. Polster v. General Guar. Mortgage Co., 180 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
481. FLA. R. CIm. P. 1.510(b) (1).
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The court, following federal precedent,48 2 held that the trial court should
be afforded the greatest possible latitude in correcting its own errors.
Although notice to the adverse party is required when a party files
a motion for relief, no new service of process is necessary.
8 3
When a party files a motion for relief from a judgment on the ground
that he has "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing,' 48 4
he must, in the motion or attached exhibits, show facts to indicate that
the evidence was not, or could not have been, readily available at trial.
Otherwise, the motion for relief should not be granted, and it is an abuse
of discretion to do so.
4 8 5
The purpose of the rule authorizing relief from judgments because of
mistake and inadvertence48 6 is not to help a party state a cause of action
which, by oversight or inadvertence, he did not include in his pleadings. 8
However, when counsel mistakenly calculates the twenty days which
have been allotted in which to file an amended complaint from the date of
written order rather than the date of the verbal order, it is error for the
trial judge to deny the motion for relief. The court held that the rule was
designed to alleviate such a situation and that judicial discretion should
be exercised in favor of deciding issues on the merits. s8
When a defendant fails to respond to the court's summons on two
occasions and a default judgment is entered against him, "excusable neg-
lect ' 4 9 is not established by alleging that a person involved in the matter,
but not a party to the suit, told the defendant to forget about the com-
plaint.490 Gross negligence is not a proper reason to set aside a judgment,
and the fact that a corporation's president failed to obtain an attorney
or appear at a hearing will not enable the corporation to set aside the
default judgment.4 9' However, when a corporation has its offices and its
principal place of business in one county and most of the officers reside
there and the plaintiff knows this fact and yet serves process on a minor
officer in another county, it may be "excusable neglect" that the corpora-
tion did not appear. Under these circumstances, the motion for relief
should be granted.492
482. The same construction is given to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See
McDowell v. Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1962).
483. Bell v. All Persons Claiming Any Estate, Etc., 198 So.2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
484. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (2).
485. Hall v. American Distrib. Corp., 181 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
486. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (1).
487. International Advertising, Inc. v. Congress Enterprises, Inc., 187 So.2d 364 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1966).
488. English v. Hecht, 189 So.2d 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
489. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (1).
490. Austin Burke, Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 179 So.2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
491. Winter Park Arms, Inc. v. Akerman, 199 So.2d 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
492. Imperial Towers, Inc. v. Dade Home Serv., Inc., 199 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1967).
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In McCormick v. McCormick,493 the husband and wife had entered
into a stipulation and agreement regarding alimony and division of
property which was incorporated into the divorce decree. The wife sub-
sequently moved for relief from the judgment on the ground of fraud.4 94
The court held that when it appeared from the facts that the husband
had not made a full disclosure to his wife and the wife's attorney merely
relied on the representations of the husband, there was ground for pro-
viding the relief sought.
XIX. DECLARATORY RELIEF
The test of the sufficiency of a complaint for a declaratory decree is
not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in getting
a declaration in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether
he is entitled to a declaration of his rights at all. Regardless of the com-
prehensive language of the statute authorizing such relief,49 the scope
of a declaratory decree proceeding is not limitless.49
It is not error for a trial judge to issue a final decree of dismissal in
a declaratory decree action when the plaintiff has filed three amended com-
plaints, all defective because of failure to show a justiciable issue, and
where it appears that the plaintiff's cause of action, if any, is at law.497
XX. INJUNCTIONS
In Daniel v. Williams,49 the trial judge, in an action for an injunc-
tion, issued a temporary restraining order. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were carrying on a business under an unconstitutional statute
and causing irreparable injury and damaging plaintiff's business. On appeal,
the court reversed, holding that since the crux of the complaint was to
enjoin the enforcement of a statute, it should have been filed against the
appropriate state agencies. The relief sought was to enjoin individuals
from enjoying the benefits of a presumably constitutional statute. How-
ever, there can be no collateral attack on the constitutionality of statutes.
Furthermore, alleged loss of business to a competitor is not sufficient to
invoke equity jurisdiction.
493. 181 So.2d 220 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
494. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (3).
495. FLA. STAT. § 87.02 (1967).
496. R-C-B-S Corp. v. City of Atlantic Beach, 178 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
497. Smith v. Jacksonville Terminal Employees Fed. Credit Union, 193 So.2d 436 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1967).
498. 189 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
